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Introduction
In this chapter we present the main motivations of the thesis together with a
detailed explanation of the structure of the work.
1. Introduction
1.1 Motivations
In this thesis we present several conditions for the existence of optimal solutions
to the problem of optimal risk sharing by starting from the assessment of the
individual preferences of the agents and by considering a topological context.
It is well known that optimal risk sharing is an argument that deserves
both theoretical and practical interest. It typically appears when considering the
classical reinsurance problem in insurance mathematics when the original insurer
cedes a part of a risk X to a reinsurer, but now it is also widely used in a variety
of financial and economical applications.
In general, the problem of finding optimal risk allocations of a given risk
X belonging to some space L+ of nonnegative random variables on a common
probability space consists in determining an allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) =
{(Y1, ..., Ym) | X = ∑mi=1 Yi} which is optimal according to some criterion. There-
fore, there are m agents (agencies) and we want to determine a Pareto optimal
allocation Y ∗i (i = 1, ...,m). The set A(X) is called the feasible set corresponding
to the risk X.
In particular, if each agent is endowed with an initial exposure Xi we shall
denote by S the set of all individually rational feasible allocations for which each
agent is at least as well as under the initial allocation (X1, .., Xm). In such a
context, the risk sharing problem is traduced on finding individually rational
Pareto-optimal allocations (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ S, (namely optimal solutions). This
clearly implies the definition of an approach necessary to describe agents decision
making behaviour.
Throughout the present work, we denote by - a preorder (i.e., a reflexive
and transitive binary relation) on a set S. A preorder is said to be total if for
any two elements Y, Z ∈ S either Y - Z or Z - Y .
In the literature, usually a functional approach is considered. By applying
the universally accepted restriction according to which the preferences of the
generic agent i only depend on its own share Yi of the risk, if we refer to a so
called reward approach, an optimal solution to the aforementioned problem is the
solution to the following multi-objective maximization problem associated to m
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assigned real-valued functions U1, ..., Um:
(1) sup (U1(Y1), U2(Y2), ..., Um(Ym))
sub
(Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S.
A vector (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ S is a solution to the previous problem provided
that for no (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S it holds that Ui(Yi) ≥ Ui(Y ∗i ) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}
with at least one strict inequality.
The functions (functionals) Ui are axiomatically defined, say. By referring
to a classical context of decision making under uncertainty, at least implicitly
the consideration of the previous problem implies that Ui is the utility func-
tion of a total preorder -i representing the preferences of agent i (i.e., for all
i ∈ {1, ...,m} and for all individual shares Yi, Zi, we have that Yi -i Zi if and
only if Ui(Yi) ≤ Ui(Zi)). Therefore, we can say that every function Ui naturally
induces a total preorder -i.
It should be noted that two main observations arise at this point:
1. The consideration of total preorders is very restrictive and a more realistic
approach should require that nontotal preorders are also incorporated in
the model;
2. In a more appropriate approach we should start from the individual (in the
meantime not necessarily total) preorders -i.
It is well known that if a preoder - is not total, than it cannot be repre-
sented by a utility function in the classical sense, as described above. Indeed, the
consideration of a (two-ways) utility functional automatically implies that the
preorder is total, due to the fact that clearly the natural (pre)order ≤ on the real
line R is total.
Based on these fundamental considerations, we shall consider the following
definitions of Pareto-optimal allocation and optimal solution in a preference-based
setting:
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(2) An allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is said to be Pareto optimal if for no
other allocation (Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) it occurs that Y ∗1 -i Y1, ..., Y ∗m -m Ym with
at least one index i such that Y ∗i ≺i Yi. If (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) belongs to the
set S of all the feasible allocations for which each agent is at least as well as
under the initial allocation (X1, .., Xm), then (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is an optimal
solution
We denote by ≺i the strict part (asymmetric part) of the individual preorder
-i.
It should be noted that if every preorder -i is total and it is represented
by a utility function Ui, then problem (2) coincides with problem (1). This
consideration motivates our approach as being more general and appropriate
than the usual ones.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized in two parts.
The first part is devoted to introduce fundamental notions on topological
preordered spaces, existence of maximal elements, preferences and functionals on
L+ spaces.
We start recalling the basic concepts concerning preorders and the existence
of maximal elements on compact sets. Indeed, as we have said before, a topologi-
cal context is assumed since Lp-spaces come naturally into consideration.
We start presenting the popular notions of upper semicontinuity of a preorder
on a topological space and upper semicontinuity of a real-valued function. We
recall that a preorder - on a set S is said to be upper semicontinuous if, for
every Y ∈ S, the upper section i-(Y ) = {Z ∈ S : Y - Z} is a closed subset of S.
In particular, in the case we consider a metric space, the previous definition is
equivalent to sequential upper semicontinuity.
In order to prove the existence of maximal elements for not necessarily total
preorders we present in a detailed way the so called “folk theorem", which guaran-
tees the existence of a maximal element for every (not necessarily total) preorder
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on a compact set provided that the preorder is upper semicontinuous. Unless
there are generalizations of this result that recently appeared in the literature,
this remains a rather general result that fits many situations. Its proof is based
on the well known Zorn’s Lemma.
Then we briefly describe fundamental properties of preferences on L+ spaces.
We start presenting monotonicity conditions with respect to stochastic orders; in
particular, when comonotone allocations are considered, we can limit ourself to
comonotone feasible allocations, provided that appropriate monotonicity condi-
tions with respect to the second stochastic order -SSD are imposed. This kind of
arguments are based on the well known improvement theorem.
We also introduce some aspects on functionals on L+ in order to fully char-
acterize distortion risk measures.
The second part is devoted on analyzing the problem of Optimal risk sharing
in a preference based approach, that is, we shall study the preordered sets rep-
resenting individual and coalition preference decision making behaviour among
feasible allocations.
We start considering a "coalition" preference decision making behaviour,
expressed by the coalition preorder - on A(X). The aforementioned restriction ac-
cording to which the individual preorder -i only depends on the individual share
of agent i (for i = 1, ...,m) allows us to consider a social preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i.
From the previous considerations it is clear that we shall assume that every
individual preference -i is actually defined on A(X). If we define A(X)|i as
follows: A(X)|i = {Yi ∈ L+ : ∃ (Y1, .., Yi−1, Yi+1, .., Ym) s.t. (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ A(X)}
it is clear that -i is defined on A(X) but it is restricted to elements on A(X)|i.
We prove that there exists an optimal solution in a general preference-based
setting provided that every individual preorder -i is upper semicontinuous and
the feasible set A(X) is compact. We also consider, when possible, the set
S = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) : Xi -i Yi, ..., Xm -i Ym}, with (X1, ..., Xm) ∈ A(X),
i.e., we start from an initial allocation and therefore we consider the individually
rational case. The consideration of the weak∗ - topology is of help in order to
guarantee the compactness of S.
Other results in this direction concern the case of translation invariant indi-
vidual preorders -i (i.e., preorders for which Yi - Zi if and only if Yi+ c - Zi+ c,
for all Yi, Zi ∈ L+ and for every constant c). The case of individual preferences
expressed by total preorders endowed with translation invariant utility functions
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is particularly favorable since it guarantees that determining Pareto optimal
allocations is in fact equivalent to determining optimal solutions for every choice
of the initial exposures.
The optimal risk sharing problem in a functional approach is frequently
identified with the sup-convolution problem relative to the functions U1, ..., Um:
(3) U1U2...Um(Y1, ..., Ym) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Yi).
It is well known that problems (1) and (3) do not coincide, in general, but
the solutions to problem (3) are always solutions to problem (1).
The reference to the general preference-based setting allows us to use the
classical representations of nontotal preorders in order to take advantage of the
above sup-convolution problem under upper semicontinuity of the functions Ui
together with the assumption of compactness of the feasible set A(X). By the
way, a relevant example in our framework of a (upper-semi)continuous functional
is provided by the Choquet integral, when we consider the topology L∞ of (essen-
tially) bounded functions on a common probability space.
Indeed, the reader may recall that there are essentially two kinds of repre-
sentation of a not necessarily total preorder - on a set S:
1. The representation based on the existence of an order-preserving function
U (i.e., a --increasing function U which preserves the strict part ≺ of -);
2. The so called multi-utility representation of the preorder -, according to
which there exists a family U of --increasing functions such that, for all
Y,Z ∈ S, Y - Z is equivalent to U(Y ) ≤ U(Z) for all U ∈ U .
The aforementioned representations are basically different since the first
one only provides, say, the essential information about the preorder - for the
purpose of determining its maximal elements, while the second fully characterizes
the preorder. We use these two notions in order to guarantee the existence of
optimal solutions, and to this aim we appropriately refer to well known results in
mathematical utility theory (for example, Rader’s theorem). In particular, we
guarantee the existence of upper-semicontinuous order -preserving functions Ui
or else we assume the existence of a finite multi-utility representation U in order
to determine the optimal solutions by means of a maximization of one single
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function, as in problem (3).
We also show, in a functional setting, that problems (1) and (3) coincide
in case that the functions Ui are all comonotone super-additive and positively
homogeneous, therefore in some sense completing a well known result from the
literature according to which the two problems coincide in case that all the
functions are translation invariant.
It is clear that a risky approach is perfectly symmetrical to ours, and it is
based on the consideration of the inf-convolution problem.
As a natural extension to the sup-convolution problem, we study the problem
of risk sharing in the presence of different risky outcomes. In such a context,
the m agents make a choice among different risky outcomes by comparing the
shares corresponding to every risky option. This problem will be referred to
the existence of maximal elements for a not necessarily total coalition prorder.
Under particular assumptions that guarantee the existence of the sup-convolution
for every risky outcome, the coalition preorder is total and the related utility
function is the associated sup-convolution.
This work ends with brief considerations about comonotonicity and risk
sharing re-adapting the main propositions and theorems of the thesis to the case
of comonotone allocations, together with well known results from the literature.
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Part I
Background

2
Topological preordered
spaces and the existence of
maximal elements
In this chapter we present fundamental notions of real representation of topological
preordered spaces and the existence of maximal elements
2. Topological preordered spaces and the existence of maximal elements
2.1 Introduction
In the following chapters we will study the problem of optimal risk sharing among
two or more agents. As we have previously introduced, this problem basically
consists in finding the conditions that allow a feasible allocation to be both Pareto
optimal and individually rational (namely optimal solution).
As we will see, the problem related to the existence of optimal solutions can
be expressed in terms of the existence of maximal elements for a not necessarily
total coalition preorder.
In this chapter we briefly express the conditions for the existence of maximal
elements for topological preordered spaces.
In the first section we are concerned with the real representation of preordered
sets. Since we deal with not necessarily total preorders, we present the basic
concepts of an order-preserving function and that of a multi-utility representation
of a preorder. The elements will be denoted by small letters in the usual way,
unless in the next chapter we shall consider (topological) vector spaces of real
random variables, therefore indicated by capital letters.
The second section is devoted to the (semi)continuous real representation of
topological preordered spaces and to the existence of maximal elements.
We start presenting the popular notions of upper semicontinuity of a preorder
on a topological space and upper semicontinuity of a real-valued function. In
particular, in the case we consider a metric space, the previous definitions are
equivalent to sequential upper semicontinuity.
Then, we recall the basic properties of compact spaces in order to prove the
so called folk theorem, according to which an upper semicontinuous preorder on
a compact topological space admits a maximal element. In parallel we furnish
a brief characterization of topology generated by maps, necessary to introduce
theorems of functional analysis. We also furnish a separate proof of the folk
theorem concerning the case when the preorder has a finite upper semicontinuous
multi-utility representation on a compact space.
The interest of this latter case will become clear in the next chapter, when
the existence of optimal solutions will be related to the existence of maximal
elements for a unique coalition (or social) preorder.
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2.2 Preference and Utility
In this paragraph and throughout the thesis, the symbol ¬ stands for “not".
Definition 2.2.1 (preorders). A preorder - on a nonempty set S is a binary
relation on S which is reflexive (i.e., x - x for all x ∈ S) and transitive (i.e.,
x - y and y - z imply x - z for all x, y, z ∈ S).
If in addition - is antisymmetric (i.e., x - y and y - x imply x = y for all
x, y ∈ S), then we shall refer to - as an order.
If - is a preorder (order) on S, then the related set (S,-) will be referred
to as a preordered set (respectively, an ordered set).
A preorder - is said to be total if x - y or y - x for all x, y ∈ S.
Definition 2.2.2 (indifference, strict preference and incomparability). Given
a preorder - on a set S, define, for every x, y ∈ S, the binary relations ∼
(indifference relation ), ≺ (strict preference relation) and ./ (incomparability
relation):
x ∼ y ⇔ (x - y) and (y - x), (2.1)
x ≺ y ⇔ (x - y) and ¬(y - x), (2.2)
x ./ y ⇔ ¬(x - y) and ¬(y - x). (2.3)
Remark 2.2.3. The strict part ≺ of any preorder - on a set S is acyclic, i.e.
it satisfies the following property for all elements x0, ..., xn ∈ S and every positive
integer n > 1:
(x0 ≺ x1) and (x2 ≺ x3) and ... and (xn−1 ≺ xn)⇒ ¬(xn ≺ x0).
Definition 2.2.4 (increasing function). Given a preordered set
(S,-), a function u : (S,-) → (R,≤) is said to be a increasing on (S,-)
if, for all x, y ∈ S,
x - y ⇒ u(x) ≤ u(y)
13
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Definition 2.2.5 (lower and upper sections). Given a preorder - on a set S,
for every x ∈ S we set the following subsets of S:
l(x) = {y ∈ S | y ≺ x}, r(x) = {z ∈ S | x ≺ z},
d(x) = {y ∈ S | y - x}, i(x) = {z ∈ S | x - z}.
2.2.1 Order-preserving functions
Definition 2.2.6 (order-preserving function). Given a preordered set (S,-),
a function u : (S,-)→ (R,≤) is said to be an order-preserving function on (S,-)
if it is increasing on (S,-) and, for all x, y ∈ S,
x ≺ y ⇒ u(x) < u(y).
Remark 2.2.7. It is clear that a function u : (S,-) → (R,≤) on a totally
preordered set (S,-) is order-preserving if and only if, for all x, y ∈ S,
x - y ⇔ u(x) ≤ u(y). (2.4)
In this case, u is said to be a utility function on (S,-).
In economic literature, an order preserving function is often referred to
as a Richter-Peleg utility function ( see Richter33 and Peleg31). This kind of
representation furnishes, in some sense, an approximate description of a not
necessary total preorder and does not allow to fully characterize the original
preorder.
We now recall the central concept of multi-utility representation which has
been recently introduced in order to deal with the non-total cases in an effective
way.
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2.2.2 Multi-utility representations
Definition 2.2.8 (multi-utility representation). A multi-utility representation
of a preorder - on a set S is a family U of functions u : (S,-) −→ (R,≤) such
that that for all x, y ∈ S,
x - y ⇔ [u(x) 6 u(y), for all u ∈ U ]. (2.5)
The multi-utility representation is in some sense the best kind of represen-
tation since it characterizes the preorder by means of a family of real-valued
functions. Please notice that, if U is a multi-utility representation of a preorder
- on a set S, we have that, for x, y ∈ S,
x ./ y ⇔ [∃u1, u2 ∈ U : (u1(x) < u1(y)) and (u2(x) > u2(y))].
The concept of a multi-utility representation was introduced by Ok27 in
the case of a finite representing family and then deeply investigated by Evren
and Ok,22 who studied the difficult problem of guaranteeing the existence of a
continuous representation of this kind. Such a problem was also studied more
recently by Bosi and Herden.7 The case of finite multi-utility representations was
carefully considered by Kaminski.24
2.3 Existence of Maximal elements
In the sequel, the natural topology on the real line will be denoted by τnat.
Definition 2.3.1 (topological proerdered space). A triplet (S,-, τ) is said
to be a topological preordered space if (S,-) is a preordered set and (S, τ) is a
topological space.
Throughout the thesis, we shall frequently refer to the case when the topology
τ = τ|| · || is induced by a metric || · || on S.
15
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2.3.1 Semicontinuity
Definition 2.3.2 (continuous and upper semicontinuous preorder). A preorder
- on a topological space (S, τ) is said to be
1. upper (lower) semicontinuous if i(x) (d(x)) is a closed subset of S for every
x ∈ S;
2. continuous if it is both lower and upper semicontinuous.
It is clear that a total preorder - on a topological space (S, τ) is upper
semicontinuous if and only if l(x) is an open subset of S for every x ∈ S.
Since in the sequel we will often deal with topological metric spaces, it is of
interest to recall the well known result showing that closed sets are indeed closed
as far as sequences are concerned.
Proposition 2.3.3. Assume that S is a subset of a metric space A. Then,
the following are equivalent:
1. S is closed;
2. if {xn} is a convergent sequence of elements in S, then the limit a =
limn→∞ xn always belongs to S.
Remark 2.3.4. From the previous Proposition, it is clear that if a preorder
- on a topological metric space (S, τ) is upper (lower) semicontinuous, then i(x)
(d(x)) is a sequentially closed subset of S for every x ∈ S.
Let us now recall the basic notion of an upper semicontinuous function.
Definition 2.3.5 (upper semicontinuous real-valued function). A real-valued
function u on an arbitrary topological space (S, τ) is said to be upper semicon-
tinuous if
u−1(]−∞, α[) = {x ∈ S : u(x) < α}
16
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is an open set for every α ∈ R. Analogously, a real-valued function u on an
arbitrary topological space (S, τ) is said to be lower semicontinuous if
u−1(]α,+∞[) = {x ∈ S : α < u(x)}
is an open set for every α ∈ R.
In the case when we consider a metric space, the previous definition of
an upper semicontinuous function is equivalent to the following definition of a
sequentially upper semicontinuous function, that we also present for the sake of
completeness.
Definition 2.3.6 (sequentially upper semicontinuous real-valued function).
A real-valued function u on an arbitrary topological space (S, τ) is said to be
sequentially upper semicontinuous if the following condition is verified :
for every point x ∈ X and every sequence {xn}n∈N in (S, τ) converging to x
the equation u(x) ≥ limn→∞ sup f(xn) = infk supn>k f(xn) holds.
It is important to notice that every upper semicontinuous preorder - on a
topological space (S, τ) has an upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation
(see Ok,27 Proposition 2).
This result was slightly improved by Bosi and Zuanon,9 in particular provid-
ing that if a preorder - has an upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation,
then the preorder is upper semicontinuous.
Proposition 2.3.7. Let - be a preorder on a topological space (S, τ). Then
the following conditions are equivalent.
1. - has an upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation;
2. - is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). Assume that - has an upper semicontinuous multi-utility
representation. If for two elements x, z ∈ S we have that z ∈ S\i(x), then there
exists an upper semicontinuous increasing function u : (S, τ)→ (R,≤, τnat) such
17
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that u(z) < u(x) and therefore u−1(]−∞, u(x)[) is an open decreasing subset of
S containing z such that
u−1(]−∞, u(x)[) ∩ i(x) = ∅
. Therefore i(x) is closed for every x ∈ S.
(2) ⇒ (1) Assume that - is upper semicontinuous on (S, τ) and denote by
χ(A) the indicator function of any subset A ⊂ S (i.e., χ(x) = 1 if x ∈ A, and
χ(x) = 0 if x /∈ A). Then observe that
{χ(i-(x))}|x∈S
is an upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation of -. 2
The problem concerning the existence of semicontinuous or continuous order-
preserving functions was extensively treated in the literature since its relevance
in mathematical economics and game theory (see, e.g., Bridges and Mehta13).
2.3.2 Compactness
In a topological space a fundamental property is the compactness.
Let us now recall the definition of a compact topological space and a well
known characterization of compactness.
Definition 2.3.8. A topological space (S, τ) is said to be compact if for every
family {Oα}α∈I of open subsets of S such that
S ⊆
⋃
α∈I
Oα
there exists a finite subfamily {Oα1 , ..., Oαn} such that
S ⊆
n⋃
i=1
Oαi
18
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In other terms, every open cover of S admits a finite subcover.
Definition 2.3.9. A collection {Fα}α∈I of subsets of a set S is said to have
the finite intersection property if the intersection
n⋂
i=1
Fαi
of every subfamily {Fα1 , ..., Fαn} of {Fα}α∈I is nonempty.
In the following chapters we will frequently deal with subspace of compact
sets, then we include the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.10. A closed subspace of a compact topological space (S, τ) is
compact.
The following theorem is well known and appears in every book of general
topology (see e.g. Engelking20).
Theorem 2.3.11. A topological space (S, τ) is compact if and only if every
family {Fα}α∈I of closed subsets of S with the finite intersection property actually
satisfies ⋂
α∈I
Fα 6= ∅
For the sake of completeness, we include the statement of the following
famous theorem.
Theorem 2.3.12. (Baire Maximum Value Theorem) Let S be a compact
topological space and u an upper semicontinuous real function on X. Then,
{x ∈ S : f(x) = sup u(X)}
is a nonempty compact subset of S.
Definition 2.3.13 (maximal elements). Given a preordered set (S,-), an
element x∗ ∈ S is said to be a maximal element (for -) if for no x ∈ S it occurs
that x∗ ≺ x.
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Since we will frequently deal with non-empty subsets of ordered set, we
include the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3.14. Every finite non-empty subset of a ordered set has maximal
and minimal elements.
We include the simple proof of the following proposition, since it concerns a
situation that will frequently occur in the next chapter.
Proposition 2.3.15. If (S, τ,-) is a compact topological preordered space and
u : (S, τ,-)→ (R, τnat,≤)
is an upper semicontinuous order-preserving function for - on S, then there is a
maximal element x∗ ∈ S.
Proof. By contraposition, assume that there is no maximal element relative to
- on S. Then ⋃
x∈S
u−1(]−∞, u(x)[)
is an open cover of S. Since S is a compact topological space, there exists a finite
subset {x1, ..., xn} of S such that
n⋃
i=1
u−1(]−∞, u(xi)[)
is also an open cover of S. Since it is clear that the family
{u−1(]−∞, u(xi)[)}i=1,...,n
is linearly ordered by set inclusion, assume without loss of generality that
u−1(]−∞, u(x1)[) ⊂ u−1(]−∞, u(x2)[) ⊂ ... ⊂ u−1(]−∞, u(xn)[)
. Then xn should belong to some set
u−1(]−∞, u(xi¯)[) with i¯ < n
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and we arrive at the contradiction that
xn ∈ u−1(]−∞, u(xn)[)
. This consideration completes the proof. 2
We now recall the classical Rader’s Theorem (see Rader,32 and Bosi and
Zuanon8).
We start recalling the definitions of second countable and separable topological
spaces.
Definition 2.3.16. A topological space (S, τ) is said to be second countable
if there exists a countable family B = {Bn}n∈N of open subsets of S such that
every open set O is expressed as the union of a subfamily of B. B is said to be a
countable basis for the topology τ .
Definition 2.3.17. A topological space (S, τ) is said to be separable if there
exists a countable subset D of S such that O ∩D 6= ∅ for every nonempty open
set O
Then, we can introduce the classical Rader’s Theorem as follows:
Theorem 2.3.18. Every upper semicontinuous total preorder on a second
countable topological space has an upper semicontinuous utility representation
Remark 2.3.19. Recall that a compact metric space (S, τ|| · ||) is separable
and therefore second countable (see e.g, Engelking20).
Corollary 2.3.20. If (S, || · ||) is a compact metric space and - is an upper
semicontinuous total preorder on (S, || · ||), then there is an upper semicontinuous
utility function u for -, and x∗ ∈ S is a maximal element for - if and only if
u(x∗) = sup u(S)
Proof. Since S is a compact metric space, it is separable and therefore second
countable. Therefore, the upper semicontinuous total preorder - on (S, τ|| · ||)
admits an upper semicontinuous utility function u by Rader’s theorem. It is clear
that there is a maximal element x∗ for - by the above Proposition 2.3.15. Finally,
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the fact that x∗ ∈ S is a maximal element for - if and only if u(x∗) = sup u(S)
is an immediate consequence of the assumption according to which - is total.
2
2.3.3 Topology generated by maps
We are now interested on including a brief characterization of weak topology
(see Conway,16 Rudin35 and Pedersen30), that is necessary to understand some
important applications of Functional Analysis Theorems. Until now we have seen
that, given a topology (collection of open sets) we can decide whether a function
is continuous. We can now reverse this argument. Consider a set X, a collection
of topological spaces (Yi)i∈I and a collection of maps (fi)i∈I such that:
fi : X → Yi ∀i ∈ I
We would like to define a topology on X such that all (fi)i∈I are continous, and
we want to do this in the coarsest way, that is the topology with the fewest open
sets. So we need to characterize the collection of open sets OX . Obviously every
preimage f−1i (Oi) of every open set Oi ∈ Yi under any fi must be included in
OX . Then, finite intersection of these open sets should be open and then the
union of (possibly infinitely many) finite intersections should be open. The next
Lemma states that this collection is a topology:
Lemma 2.3.21. The collection of all unions of finite intersection of sets of
the form (f−1i (Oi))i∈I where Oi is an open set in Yi, is a topology. It is called
the weak topology of X with respect to (fi)i∈I , denoted by σ(X, (fi)i∈I).
Le now X be a topological vector space over some field K. Recall the
following definitions:
Definition 2.3.22. A linear functional on X is a linear map X → K.
Definition 2.3.23. The dual space of X, denoted by X∗, is the space of all
linear functionals on X that are continuous with respect to the given topology.
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Definition 2.3.24. The weak* topology on X is the coarsest topology (the
topology with the fewest open sets) such that each element of X∗ remains a
continuous function.
2.3.4 Tychonov theorem
A particular class of weak topology is the product topology.
Let Xα∈A be topological spaces, where A is the index set. Then we have
the following definitions:
Definition 2.3.25. The cartesian product of Xα nonempty sets is given by:∏
α∈A
Xα = {f : A→
⋃
α∈A
Xα, f(α) ∈ Xα}
that is, the sets of maps with domain A such that for each α ∈ A the map selects
an element of Xα
If we consider now the projection maps:
pα :
∏
α∈A
Xα → Xα
we can introduce the product topology as follows:
Definition 2.3.26. The product topology on ∏α∈AXα is the coarest topology
such that all projection maps pα are continuous.
Then we can introduce the well known Tychonov theorem:
Theorem 2.3.27. Let {Xα : α ∈ A} be a family of compact topological spaces.
Then the cartesian product ∏α∈AXα is compact in the product topology.
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2.3.5 Banach Alaoglu theorem
The Tychonov Theorem is essential to proove a fundamental compactness result
of Functional Analysis, the Banach-Alaoglu Theorem (see Alaoglu2)
Theorem 2.3.28. Let X be a normed space, then for any r > 0, the closed
ball
Br = {x∗ ∈ X∗ s.t. ‖x∗‖ ≤ r}
of its dual space is compact in the weak* topology.
This theorem will be applied, for example, to state the compactness in the
weak topology σ(L∞, L1) of closed balls in L∞.
We can now consider the classical and well-known Zorn’s lemma (see Kura-
towski26 and Zorn39) indicating a condition for the existence of maximal elements
for a preordered set.
2.3.6 Zorn’s Lemma
Lemma 2.3.29. (Zorn’s Lemma) Suppose that a partially (pre)ordered set S
has the property that every chain C (i.e. totally ordered subset) has an upper
bound in S (i.e., there exists k ∈ S such that x - k for all x ∈ C). Then the set
S contains at least one maximal element.
The Zorn’s Lemma, in one of its equivalent form, implies the Tychonov
Theorem in topology, to which it is also equivalent (see Kelley25).
In particular, we will apply the Zorn’s Lemma in order to prove the “folk“
theorem in the sequel, guaranteeing the existence of a maximal element for an
upper semicontinuous preorder on a compact topological space. For reader’s
convenience, we present also its proof.
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2.3.7 "Folk" theorem
Theorem 2.3.30. Let (S, τ) be a compact topological space, and - an upper
semicontinuous preorder on (S, τ). Then there exists a maximal element relative
to -.
Proof. From the above Zorn’s Lemma, the thesis follows if every chain C has an
upper bound in S. Let C be a chain in S. Then, any element of
⋂
z∈C
i(z)
provides an upper bound for C. Therefore we only need to prove that
⋂
z∈C
i(z) 6= ∅
. Since i(z) is closed for every z ∈ S, and S is compact, it suffices to show that
the family
{i(z) : z ∈ C}
has the finite intersection property (see Theorem 2.3.11). So, let us consider a
finite subset C˜ of C and the associated finite collection
{i(z) | z ∈ C˜}
. Since ⋂
z∈C˜
i(z) = i(max C˜)
is nonempty (see Theorem 2.3.14), the thesis follows. 2
In the next chapter we shall frequently refer to existence of an upper
semicontinuous multi-utility representation.
25
2. Topological preordered spaces and the existence of maximal elements
2.3.8 Upper semicontinuous multi-utility representations
Definition 2.3.31 (upper-semicontinuous multi-utility representation). An
upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation of a preorder - on a topological
space (S, τ) is a family U of upper semicontinuous functions u : (S,-, τ) −→
(R,≤, τnat) which is also a multi-utility representation of -.
In the particular case when a finite upper semicontinuous multi-utility repre-
sentation exists, it is possible to provide a proof of the folk theorem (i.e., Theorem
2.3.30) which doesn’t use Zorn’s lemma, but only lexicographic arguments, say.
The following theorem is an adaptation from Evren and Ok.22
Theorem 2.3.32. Let (S, τ) be a compact topological space, and let - be
a preorder on (S, τ) which admits a finite upper semicontinuous multi-utility
representation U = {u1, ..., un}. Then there exists a maximal element relative to
-.
Proof. Define S1 = argmax {u1(x) : x ∈ S}. Observe that, from Theorem
2.3.12, S1 is a compact subset of S. Define subsequently, for i = 1, ..., n,
Si = argmax {ui(x) : x ∈
i−1⋂
h=1
Sh}
. Then x∗ ∈ argmax {un(x) : x ∈ Sn} is a maximal element for -. Indeed, for
all y ∈ S,
x∗ - y ⇔ ui(x∗) ≤ ui(y) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} ⇒ y ∈
n⋂
i=1
Si
⇒ ui(x∗) = ui(y) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},
and therefore x∗ ≺ y is false, implying that x∗ is actually a maximal element for
- on S. 2
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In the following chapter we are going to introduce fundamental functional
properties that are recurrent in the general risk sharing functional-approach.
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Preferences on L+ spaces
In this chapter we restrict our attention to random variables from L+ spaces
(i.e., a topological vector space of nonnegative random variables), analyzing
some properties on preferences necessary to introduce the risk sharing problem
formulation
3. Preferences on L+ spaces
3.1 Introduction
Since we often deal with (topological) metric spaces, it is necessary to introduce
basic notions on normed vector spaces.
In particular, we restrict our attention to random variables belonging to
topological vector spaces of nonnegative random variables. In this case, the
concept of norm (sup-norm), clearly induces a metric.
We study the conditions that allow a preorder to be consistent with stochastic
orders. Particularly relevant is the case preferences are consistent with second
stochastic order dominance since this concept will be useful in the case we deal
with comonotone allocations in the risk-sharing setting.
Then, we introduce some aspects on functionals on L+ in order to fully
characterize distortion risk measures. Particularly relevant is the case of Choquet
integral with respect to a convex probability distortion, since it is an example
of translation invariant, comonotone superadditive, positively homoseneous and
normalized functional.
The interest of this latter case will become clear in the next chapters, when
the existence of optimal solutions will be related to the existence of solutions to
the sup convolution problem.
3.2 Continuity with respect to the Norm Topology
Denote by R (R+) the set of all real numbers (respectively, the set of all nonneg-
ative real numbers).
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, and denote by 1 F the indicator function
of any subset F of Ω.
Let L+ be a vector space of nonnegative real random variables on (Ω,F ,P).
In particular, L+ could be specialized as the space L∞+ of nonnegative bounded
random variables, or else the space L1+ (L2+) of integrable (respectively, square
integrable) nonnegative random variables on (Ω,F ,P).
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We recall the well known general definition of Lp-space (1 ≤ p <∞).
Definition 3.2.1 (Lp-space). The space Lp(Ω) consists of all measurable
functions X : Ω −→ R such that∫
| X |p dP = E | Xp |<∞.
The Lp-norm of X ∈ Lp(Ω) is defined by
|| X ||Lp=
(∫
| X |p dP
) 1
p
.
Example 3.2.2. A classical example of a L2-norm continuous utility func-
tional is
U(X) = E[X]− αV ar[X] (α > 0).
Remark 3.2.3. We just recall that this kind of functional is very popular in
the literature, since the consideration of the variance can be explained with the
incorporation of "transaction costs".
Definition 3.2.4 (sup-norm topology). The sup-norm on the space L∞+ (Ω,F)
of all bounded measurable functions on the measurable space (Ω,F) is defined as
follows:
|| X ||= sup
ω∈Ω
| X(ω) | .
The norm topology on L∞+ (Ω,F) is the topology corresponding to the norm
above.
Remark 3.2.5. Since this topology focuses on situations involving extremal
events, such as catastrophes, this may be called the "topology of fear". This
topology is focused on extremals, and as a result is much more restrictive in
defining "proximity". The function "sup" is continuous with respect to the sup-
norm, but not continuous with respect to the standard "averaging" topology.
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3.3 Preferences consistence with stochastic orders
We briefly discuss the conditions that allow a preference relation to be consistent
with second stochastic order. The importance of second stochastic dominance
consistency will be clear when we will face the problem of efficient risk sharing
restricting our attention to comonotone allocations.
We start introducing basic definitions in order to fully characterize stochastic
orders.
If for two random variables X,Y ∈ L+ we have that X(ω) ≤ Y (ω) for ω ∈ Ω
P-almost surely, then we shall simply write X ≤ Y . We have that ≤ is a preorder
on L+.
Definition 3.3.1 (total preorder). A preorder - on a vector space L+ is said
to be total if X - Y or Y - X for all random variables X,Y ∈ L+.
Definition 3.3.2 (Monotonicity). A preorder - on a vector space L+ is said
to be monotone if X ≤ Y implies that X - Y for all random variables X,Y ∈ L+.
Definition 3.3.3 (translation invariance). A preorder - on a vector space
L+ of nonnegative random variables is said to be translation invariant if the
following condition holds for every positive real number c (identified with the
constant random variable equal to c), and all random variables X,Y ∈ L+,
X - Y ⇔ X + c - Y + c. (3.1)
Denote by SX(t) = 1 − FX(t) = P({ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) > t}) the decumulative
distribution function of any random variable X ∈ L+.
Recall that two random variables X and Y are said to be equivalent, or equal
in law, or equal in distribution, iff they have the same probability distribution
function, i.e.,
X
d=Y ⇔ FX(x) = FY (y) ∀ x ∈ R
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The shorthand X ∼ U(0, 1) is used to indicate that the random variable X has
the standard uniform distribution with minimum 0 and maximum 1. A standard
uniform random variable X has probability density function
f(x) = 1 0 < x < 1.
For the sake of convenience, a constant random variable equal to c ∈ R will
be also be denoted by c.
Definition 3.3.4 (first order stochastic dominance). Let X, Y be random
variables ∈ L+ with distribution functions FX and FY . Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
• X is said to precede Y in first order stochastic dominance, denoted by
X -st Y ;
• FY (t) ≤ FX(t) for all t ∈ R;
• E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for all increasing functions f .
Definition 3.3.5 (second order stochastic dominance). Let X, Y be random
variables ∈ L+ with distribution functions FX and FY . Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
• X is said to precede Y in second order stochastic dominance, denoted by
X -SSD Y ;
• ∫ x−∞ FY (t)dt ≤ ∫ x−∞ FX(t)dt for all x ∈ R;
• E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for all increasing concave functions f .
Definition 3.3.6 (stop-loss order stochastic dominance). Let X, Y be random
variables ∈ L+. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
• X is said to precede Y in stop-loss order, denoted by X -sl Y ;
• E[(X − d)+] = E[max{X − d, 0}] 6 E[(Y − d)+] = E[max{Y − d, 0}], for
all d ∈ R;
• E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for all increasing convex functions f .
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Definition 3.3.7 (convex order stochastic dominance). Let X, Y be random
variables ∈ L+. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
• X is said to precede Y in convex order, denoted by X -CX Y ;
• X -sl Y and E[X] = E[Y ];
Remark 3.3.8. Note that convex order is equivalent to ordering with respect
to second stochastic dominance with equal means (see Rothschild and Stiglitz47).
3.4 Comonotonic sets
The concept of comonotonicity is actually a robust tool in order to solve several
research and applicative problems in capital allocation and risk sharing.
In this section we are going to briefly list fundamental implications of
comonotonicity. We start from the definition of comonotone random variables.
Definition 3.4.1 (comonotone random variables). Two random variables
X,Y ∈ L+ are said to be comonotone if
(X(ω1)−X(ω2))(Y (ω1)− Y (ω2)) ≥ 0
for ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω P-almost surely.
3.4.1 The Univariate case
We want now to introduce comonotonic properties of a set X ⊆ Rm, in particular
considering the correlation between the definition of comonotonicity and the total
order structure of R.
The following characterization of comonotonic random vectors are well
known, see for istance Dhaene.19
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Definition 3.4.2 (Comonotonic Set). The set X ⊆ Rm is said to be comono-
tonic if it is ≤-totally ordered, i.e. if for any (X1, ...., Xm), (X ′1, ...., X ′m) ∈ X,
either (X1, ...., Xm) ≤ (X ′1, ...., X ′m) or (X ′1, ...., X ′m) ≤ (X1, ...., Xm).
Theorem 3.4.3. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The random vector (X1, ...., Xm) is comonotonic;
2. F(X1,....,Xm)(x1, ..., xm) = min{FX1(x1), ...., FXm(xm)}
3. (X1, ...., Xm)
d={F−1X1 (U), ...., F−1Xm(U)} where U ∼ Unif [0, 1];
4. There exists a random variable Z and nondecreasing functions fi(i =
1, ...,m) s.t. (X1, ...., Xm)
d=(f1(Z), ..., fm(Z)).
Note that only the total order structure of R is needed in order to define
comonotonic random vectors. In fact, the definition of comonotonicity can be
extended to sets of measurable functions with values in any totally preordered set
C endowed with the σ-algebra induced by the total preorder ≤C . Then, definition
3.4.1 becomes (see Chateauneuf14):
Definition 3.4.4. Two random variablesX,Y ∈ L+ are said to be comonotone
if and only if
(X(ω1) <C X(ω2)) =⇒ (Y (ω1) ≤C Y (ω2))
for ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω P-almost surely.
3.4.2 The Multivariate case
As an extension to the previous case we consider comonotonic properties of
subsets of (Rm)n.
Definition 3.4.5 (Comonotonic Set). The setX ⊆ (Rm)n is said to be comono-
tonic if it is ≤-totally ordered, i.e. if for any (X1, ...., Xm), (X ′1, ...., X ′m) ∈ X
with Xi ⊆ Rn, i = 1, ..m, either (X1, ...., Xm) ≤ (X ′1, ...., X ′m) or (X ′1, ...., X ′m) ≤
(X1, ...., Xm).
Theorem 3.4.6. The following statements are equivalent:
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1. The random vector (X1, ...., Xm) is comonotonic;
2. F(X1,....,Xm)(x11, ..., xn1 , ....., x1m, ..., xnm) =
min{FX1(x11, ..., xn1 ), ...., FXm(x1m, ..., xnm)}
for all (x11, ..., xn1 , ....., x1m, ..., xnm) ∈ (Rm)n
3. There exists a random variable Z and nondecreasing functions (fi, ....., gi), i =
1, ..., n s.t.
(X1, ...., Xm)
d=((f1(Z), ..., fn(Z)), ....., (g1(Z), ..., gn(Z)).
.
3.5 Functionals on L+
In the following we are going to introduce fundamental proporties of functionals
on L+ in order to introduce distortion risk measures restricting our attention the
the well known mathematical propertis of the Choquet integral.
Definition 3.5.1 (basic properties of a real functional). A functional U from
L+ into R is said to be
1. Monotone if U(X) ≤ U(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L+ such that X ≤ Y ;
the financial meaning of monotonicity is clear: the risk of a financial
instrument with the payoff X is at least as much as another one with the
payoff Y , if former incurs at least as much losses as the latter in every state
of economy.
2. Normalized if U(11Ω) = 1;
3. Monotone with respect to First Order Stochastic Dominance if U(X) ≤
U(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L+ such that SX(t) ≤ SY (t) for all t ∈ R+;
4. Positively Homogeneous (i.e., U(γX) = γU(X) for every γ ∈ R+ and
X ∈ L+;
From a financial perspective, positive homogeneity implies that a linear
increase of the return by a positive factor leads to a linear increase in risk
by the same factor.
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5. Translation Invariant if U(X + c) = U(X) + c for all X ∈ L+ and c ∈ R+;
Translation invariance is motivated by the interpretation of U(X) as a
reserve requirement, i.e., the amount which should be raised in order to
make X acceptable from the point of view of a supervising agency.
6. Law invariant if U(X) = U(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L+ with distribution functions
FX and FY such that FX = FY ;
this assumption is essential for a functional to be estimated from empirical
data.
7. Comonotone Additive if U(X + Y ) = U(X) + U(Y ) for all comonotone
X,Y ∈ L+;
8. Comonotone Subadditive (Superadditive) if U(X + Y ) ≤ U(X) + U(Y )
(respectively, U(X + Y ) ≥ U(X) + U(Y )) for all comonotone X,Y ∈ L+;
9. Sublinear (Superlinear) if U is positively homogeneous and subadditive
(superadditive), i.e., U(X+Y ) ≤ U(X)+U(Y ) (U(X+Y ) ≥ U(X)+U(Y ))
for all X,Y ∈ L+);
financial implications of this subadditivity is obviously related to diversifi-
cation effect. Though Artzner et al. (see Artzner3 ) treat sub-additivity
as a essential demand for constructing a risk measure in order for it to
be coherent, empirical indications prescrives that subadditivity does not
always hold in reality (see Föllmer et al.23) .
10. Convex if U(λX+(1−λY )) ≤ λU(X)+(1−λ)U(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L+, 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1;
convexity explaines the diversification property relaxing the requirement
that a risk measure must be more sensitive to aggregation of large risks.
It is clear that a comonotone additive functional is also translation invariant.
Further, a functional U is translation invariant if and only if U(X+c) = U(X)+c
for all X ∈ L+ and c ∈ R ( i.e., the nonnegativity of c can be removed, see e.g.
Marinacci and Montrucchio28).
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Remark 3.5.2. If U is comonotone superadditive, positively homogeneous
and normalized functional, then U(X + c) ≥ U(X) + c for all X ∈ L+ and c ∈ R.
The following proposition is found in Parker [29, Lemma 6] (see also Bosi and
Zuanon [10, Lemma 3.2]). We present its proof here for reader’s convenience.
We recall that a real-valued functional U on a metric space (S, || · ||) said
to be uniformly continuous if for all ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all
x, y ∈ S, || x − y ||< δ implies | U(x) − U(y) |< ε. It is clear that uniform
continuity implies continuity.
Proposition 3.5.3. If U is a monotone, positively homogeneous and comono-
tone subadditive functional on L∞+ (Ω,F), then U is uniformly continuous with
respect to the sup-norm topology on L∞+ (Ω,F).
Proof. Consider any two measurable real-valued functions X,Y ∈ L∞+ (Ω,F) and
let U be a functional with the indicated properties. Then we have that
U(X)− U(Y ) ≤ U(|| X − Y || 11Ω + Y )− U(Y )
≤ || X − Y || U(11Ω) + U(Y )− U(Y )
= || X − Y || U(11Ω).
Analogously, it can be shown that U(Y )− U(X) ≤|| X − Y || U(1 Ω). Hence, we
have that | U(X)− U(Y ) |≤|| X − Y || U(1 Ω). This consideration completes the
proof. 2
Example 3.5.4 (Upper semicontinuous not continuous functional). Let G
be any family of probability distortions, and for the sake of convenience denote
by Ug(X) the Choquet integral of any random variable X with respect to the
distorted probability g ◦ P. Then define a functional U on L∞+ (Ω,F ,P) by
imposing, for all X ∈ L∞+ (Ω,F ,P),
U(X) := inf
g∈G
Ug(X).
We claim that U is upper semicontinuous on L∞+ (Ω,F ,P) endowed with the norm
topology. Indeed consider anyX ∈ L∞+ (Ω,F ,P) and α ∈ R with U(X) < α. Then
there exists g ∈ G such that Ug(X) < α and, since Ug is continuous and therefore
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in particular upper semicontinuous by Proposition 3.5.3, we have that U−1g ([0, α[)
is an open set containing X such that Ug(Z) < α for all Z ∈ U−1g ([0, α[).
3.5.1 Coherent risk measures
In Artzner et al (see Artzner3 ), coherent risk measure is defined through the
following set of axioms:
Definition 3.5.5. A real-valued functional ρ on L is said to be a coherent
risk measure if ρ is:
1. monotone;
2. translation invariant;
3. sublinear.
Coherent measures have the following general form:
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈Q
EQ[−X]
where Q is some class of probability measures on the state space Ω.
3.5.2 Distortion risk measures
In this subsection, we discuss distortion risk measures.
Distortion risk measures were introduced by Wang37 and can be defined
as the distorted expectation of any non-negative loss random variable X, so
they are closely related to the distortion expectation theory. For instance,
Tsanakas and Desli36 fully describe how risk measures can be interpreted from
several perspectives, including a clarifying explanation of the connection between
distortion risk measures and distortion expectation theory.
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There are two key elements to define a distortion risk measure: first, the
associated distortion function; and, second, the concept of the Choquet Integral
(see Choquet15).
For a complete literature review of distortion risk measures, see Denuit et
al.18 and Balbàs et al.4
Definition 3.5.6 (Choquet integral with respect to a probability distortion).
A probability distortion g is a real-valued, nondecreasing and nonnegative function
g : [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] such that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
A real-valued functional U on L∞+ (Ω,F ,P) is said to be the Choquet integral
with respect to the distorted probability µ = g ◦ P if, for all X ∈ L∞+ (Ω,F ,P),
U(X) =
∫
Xdg ◦ P =
∫ +∞
0
g(SX(t))dt. (3.2)
In particular we have that the Choquet integral satisfies the following
properties (see Denneberg (17)):
1. monotonicity;
2. positive homogeneity;
3. translation invariance;
4. comonotone additivity;
5. In the generalized case, distortion risk measures are not additive;
6. distortion risk measures are sub-additive if and only if the distortion function
g is concave;
7. For a non-decreasing distortion function g, the associated risk measure ρ is
consistent with the first stochastic dominance. The proof is given in Hardy
and Wirch38
8. For a non-decreasing concave distortion function g, the associated risk
measure ρ is consistent with the second stochastic dominance. As a result,
every coherent distortion risk measure is consistent with respect to second-
order stochastic dominance.
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9. For a strictly concave distortion function g, the associated risk measure ρ
is strictly consistent with the second stochastic dominance.
From these considerations, it is clear that the Choquet integral with respect
to a probability distortion is a coherent risk measure.
Many different distortions g have been proposed in the literature. Some
well-known ones are presented below.
• The mathematical expectation Ug(X) = E[X] is a distortion risk measure
whose distortion function is the identity function
g(x) = x
provided the mathematical expectation exists.
• The value at risk VaR has been adopted as a standard tool to assess the
risk and to calculate capital requirements in the financial industry. Value-
at-Risk at level α of a random variable X (which we often call loss), is
defined as follows:
V aRα(X) = inf{x|FX(x) ≥ α} = F−1X (α),
where FX is the distribution function (cdf) of X and α is the confidence or
the tolerance level 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
A disadvantage when using VaR in the financial context is that the capital
requirements for adverse scenarios based on the measure can be underesti-
mated.
Another problem related to VaR is that it may fail the subadditivity
property.
In particular, VaR is a distortion risk measure whose distortion function g
is represented by:
g(x) =
{
0, if 0 ≤ x < 1− α;
1, if 1− α ≤ x ≤ 1. .
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The distortion function is discontinuous in this case due to the jump at
x = 1− α. This implies that VaR is not coherent. As a result, VaR does
not represent a "well" behaved distortion function.
• Tail Value-at-Risk (TVaR) may be interpreted as the mathematical expec-
tation beyond VaR, and is defined as:
TV aRα(X) =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
V aRλ(X)dλ
The TVaR risk measure does not suffer the two disvantages discussed above
for VaR and appear to be a more powerful measure for assessing the actual
risks faced by companies and financial institutions.
In particular TVaR is a distortion risk measure whose distortion function g
is represented by:
g(x) =
{
x
1−α , if 0 ≤ x < 1− α;
1, if 1− α ≤ x ≤ 1. .
• The conditional value at risk CVaR is the conditional expectation of X
subject to X ≥ V aRα(X), i.e.
CV aRα(X) = E[X|X ≥ V aRα(X)]
In particular, CVaR is a distortion risk measure whose distortion function
g is represented by:
g(x) = min( x1− α, 1) x ∈ [0, 1]
Remark 3.5.7. CVaR is known as tail conditional expectation in Artzner
et al.,3 conditional tail expectation in Wirch and Hardy,38 mean shortfall in
Bertsimas et al.,6 and expected shortfall in Acerbi et al.1
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The use of distortion risk measurses in the risk sharing setting will be
explained in the following chapter, in particular referring to the risk redistribution
problem with distortion risk measures.
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Part II
Preference-based approach to risk sharing

4
Existence of individually
rational Pareto optimal
allocations
In this chapter we analyze the problem of optimal risk sharing in a preference
based approach, that is, we shall study the preordered sets representing individual
and coalition preference decision making behaviour among feasible allocations.
In particular, we study the existence of feasible allocations that are both Pareto
optimal and individually rational, namely optimal solutions.
4. Existence of individually rational Pareto optimal allocations
4.1 Introduction
The problem of optimal risk sharing among two or more agents has been studied
in several contexts, mostly with a risk functional approach, that is, representing
the attitude towards risk of each agent by utility functionals.
In such a context, an optimal risk sharing problem can be formulated as fol-
lows: m agents with individual exposures Xi are interested in sharing an optimal
re-allocation of their own risks Xi. Let X =
∑m
i=1Xi be the total exposure of the
agents and let Ui be the preference-functional of the i-th agent. The risk sharing
problem consists in finding an optimal allocation Yi, {i = 1, ..,m} of (uncertain)
shares of X such that X = ∑mi=1 Yi.
We will discuss in the following paragraphs the characterization of optimal
allocation. We just want now to consider that the key elements in the functional
risk sharing approach described above, are the preference functionals Ui. We
find in the literature these functionals expressed in terms of expected utility, non
expected utility, risk measures, in such a way that depends on evolving of theories
of risks.
It started with the pioneering works of Borch14 and Arrow7 with applica-
tions to insurance and reinsurance problems, where the attitude towards risk of
each agent is represented by von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility. This
approach was at the base of several papers, for example Wilson51 and Aase.1
Further extensions devoped for various decision criteria that depend on the risk
measure approach, in particular in terms of coherent or convex risk measures,
see for example Young,52 Kaluska,39,40 Barrieu and El Karoui,9 Jouini et al.,38
Ludkovski and Young,44 Acciaio,2 Bourgert and Rüschendorf.16 Recently the
optimal risk sharing problem was studied in Grechuk and Zabarankin34 and
Grechuk et al.35 with general deviation measures, in such a context that involves
not only risk preferences of individuals but also their reward-preferences. The
risk-reward risk sharing approach is also at the base of the work of Carlier et al.18
Since the works of Borch, Arrow and Wilson, it is well known that efficient
risk sharing is mutually related to the comonotonicity property. We will study
in the next chapters the implication of Comonotonicity in risk sharing with the
related connection to the literature.
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In this chapter, we are interested in describing a preference based approach,
that is, we shall study the preordered sets representing individual and coalition
preference decision making behaviour.
We start introducing the problem formulation related to finding an op-
timal solution, that is, a feasible allocation that is both Pareto optimal and
individually rational, we characterize Pareto optimal allocations describing the
order-conditions that allow an individual to prefer an allocation to another, and
then we define a coalition preorder representing the attitude of all the agents to
prefer an allocation to another one.
Then we study the existence of optimal solutions illustrating that this prob-
lem can be related to the existence of maximal elements for the coalition preorder
in A(X). Identically, we extend these considerations explaining the equivalence
between optimal solutions and maximal elements for the coalition preorder in
the set S of all the feasible allocations for which each agent is at least as well as
under the initial exposure. We will synthesize this problem by finding conditions
under which we can define an upper semicontinuous coalition preorder on the
compact set S.
Then, we introduce the so called multi-objective maximization problem in
order to produce sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal solution.
It is important to notice that we are interested on describing the not-
necessarily total ordered structure of preference relations in the context of risk
sharing. In literature we found an extensive application of risk sharing problems
starting from the assumptions that agents preferences are endowed with particular
utility functions. This clearly implies that agents preferences are total (at least
implicitly, even if the authors do not mention preferences at all).
In our context, the expression of preferences relations by using order pre-
serving functions or a multi utility representation clearly implies that we are
considering a not necessarily total order structure.
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4.2 Problem formulation
Consider an uncertain payoff X and m agents endowed with their own initial
exposures (X1, .., Xm), with X =
∑m
i=1Xi. Agent i has preferences over her own
risks which are expressed by a (not necessarily total) preorder -i (i = 1, ...,m).
Divide X into uncertain shares Y1, ..., Ym in such a way that X =
∑m
i=1 Yi,
be the total exposure.
Definition 4.2.1 (feasible allocations). For every risk X, denote by A(X)
the set of all the feasible allocations of X, i.e. the set
A(X) = {(Y1, ..., Ym) | X =
m∑
i=1
Yi}. (4.1)
It is clear that the set A(X) of all feasible allocations is a convex subset of
the product space L+m (i.e., αY + (1 − α)Z ∈ A(X) for all Y,Z ∈ A(X) and
α ∈ [0, 1]).
We now present the central concept of Pareto optimal allocation.
Definition 4.2.2 (Pareto optimal allocation). An allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈
A(X) is said to be Pareto optimal if for no other allocation (Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) it
occurs that Y ∗1 -i Y1, ..., Y ∗m -m Ym with at least one index i such that Y ∗1 ≺i Yi.
We omit the immediate proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.3. Assume that the individual preorder -i is total for ev-
ery i ∈ {1, ...,m}. Then the following conditions are equivalent concerning an
allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X):
1. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is Pareto optimal;
2. for every allocation (Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) such that Y ∗i -i Yi for i ∈ {1, ...,m}
it occurs that Y ∗i ∼i Yi for i ∈ {1, ...,m}.
The following definition is of basic importance.
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Definition 4.2.4. An allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is said to be individually
rational if all agents are at least as well off under (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) as under the initial
exposures Xi (i ∈ {1, ...,m}), so that Xi -i Y ∗i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}.
Definition 4.2.5. An allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is said to be optimal if
it is both Pareto optimal and individually rational.
To study the existence of Pareto optimal allocations and optimal solutions
we will define a coalition preorder, expression of preferences aggregation of the
individuals. We clearly characterize this concept in the following paragraph.
4.2.1 The coalition preorder
We are now interested in considering a "coalition" preference decision making
behaviour, expressed by the coalition preorder - on A(X).
In particular, we say that a coalition of m agents prefers the allocation
Y = (Y1, ..., Ym) over Z = (Z1, ..., Zm) if and only if every agents prefers her own
share Yi over Zi. Then, we can define the coalition preorder - in this way:
(Z1, ..., Zm) - (Y1, ..., Ym) ⇔ Zi -i Yi ∀i ∈ {1, ..,m}. (4.2)
Remark 4.2.6. As we already discussed in the introduction of the thesis, we
apply the universally accepted restriction according to which the preferences of
the generic agent i only depend on its own share Yi of the risk. From this afore-
mentioned restriction, the coalition preorder - can be defined as the intersection
of the individual preorders, that is:
-=
m⋂
i=1
-i . (4.3)
From the previous considerations it is clear that we shall assume that every
individual preference -i is actually defined on A(X).
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If we define A(X)|i as follows:
A(X)|i = {Yi ∈ L+ : ∃ (Y1, .., Yi−1, Yi+1, .., Ym) s.t. (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ A(X)}
it is clear that -i is defined on A(X) but it is restricted to elements on A(X)|i.
Remark 4.2.7. Observe that the preorder - is not necessarily total, even if
-i is total for every i. Indeed, for two feasible allocations Y = (Y1, ..., Ym) and
Z = (Z1, ..., Zm) there may exist two indexes i, j with Yi ≺i Zi and Zj ≺j Yj .
This consideration justifies in full the material and technique presented in the
previous chapter and in particular the considerations on the existence of maximal
elements for not necessarily total preorders.
Remark 4.2.8. It should be noted that in the particular case when every
individual preorder -i is total and admits a utility representation Ui, for all
Y = (Y1, ..., Ym) and Z = (Z1, ..., Zm) in A(X) it occurs that (Y1, ..., Ym) -
(Z1, ..., Zm) if and only if Ui(Yi) = Ui(Y ) ≤ Ui(Z) ≤ Ui(Zi). Therefore, we
have that U = {U1, ..., Um} is a finite multi-utility representation of the coalition
preorder -.
In the following section we are going to introduce fundamental concepts
necessary to fully characterize the existence of Pareto optimal allocations and
optimal solutions.
4.3 Existence of optimal solutions
In this section we are going to study the conditions that allow a feasible allocation
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) to be both Pareto optimal and individually rational, restrict-
ing our attention on the coalition preorder defined in the previous section.
We start considering the characterization of Pareto optimal allocations,
equivalent to the problem concerning the existence of maximal elements for the
coalition preorder -.
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Then we will extend this equivalence in order to characterize optimal solu-
tions and we introduce a so called multi-objective maximization problem in order
to produce sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal solution.
4.3.1 Characterization of Pareto optimal allocations
Let us now recall the definition of a translation invariant preorder.
Definition 4.3.1. A preorder - on a vector space L+ of nonnegative random
variables is said to be translation invariant if the following condition holds for
every positive real number c (identified with the constant random variable equal
to c), and all random variables X,Y ∈ L+,
X - Y ⇔ X + c - Y + c. (4.4)
Remark 4.3.2. It is easy to check that a preorder - is translation invariant
if and only if actually the above condition (4.4) holds true for every constant
random variable c.
Remark 4.3.3. It should be noted that, if - is a translation invariant total
preorder on L, then for all random variables X,Y ∈ S, and every real number c,
X ≺ Y ⇔ X + c ≺ Y + c. (4.5)
Indeed, in this case we have that ¬(X+c ≺ Y +c)⇔ ¬((X+c - Y +c) and ¬(Y +
c - X + c))⇔ Y + c - X + c⇔ Y - X ⇔ ¬(X ≺ Y ).
It is clear that a total preorder - on L is translation invariant provided that
it admits a translation invariant utility function U (i.e., U(X + c) = U(X) + c
for all X ∈ L+ and c ∈ R).
In the following proposition we present a simple but useful property exhibited
by Pareto optimal allocations in case of translation invariant individual total
preorders.
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Proposition 4.3.4. Assume that -i is a translation invariant total preorder
for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} and consider any m-tuple of real numbers (pii, ..., pim) such
that ∑mi=1 pii = 0. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
1. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is Pareto optimal;
2. (Y ∗1 + pi1, ..., Y ∗m + pim) ∈ A(X) is Pareto optimal.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) Let (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) be Pareto optimal and consider
the allocation (Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) such that Yi -i (Y ∗i + pii) for i ∈ {1, ..,m}.
By translation invariance of the total preorder -i we have that
Yi -i (Y ∗i + pii)⇔ Yi − pii -i (Y ∗i + pii − pii)⇔ Yi − pii -i Y ∗i
So
Yi − pii -i Y ∗i i ∈ {1, ..,m}
Note that the allocation (Y1 − pi1, ..., Ym − pim) with ∑mi=1 pii = 0 is in A(X) and
is only "weakly" dominated by (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) that is
[(Yi − pii -i Y ∗i ) and ¬(Y ∗i i Yi − pii)] i ∈ {1, ..,m}
The preorder -i is total, so
¬(Y ∗i i Yi − pii)⇔ Y ∗i -i Yi − pii i ∈ {1, ..,m}
So we have
[(Yi − pii -i Y ∗i ) ∧ (Y ∗i -i Yi − pii) i ∈ {1, ..,m}
that is
Yi − pii ∼i Y ∗i i ∈ {1, ..,m}
that is a condition of Pareto indifference because (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is Pareto optimal;
By translation invariance of the total preorder -i
Yi − pii ∼i Y ∗i ⇔ Yi − pii + pii ∼i Y ∗i + pii ⇔ Yi ∼i Y ∗i + pii i ∈ {1, ..,m}
Hence, the allocation (Y ∗1 + pi1, ..., Y ∗m + pim) ∈ A(X) is Pareto optimal.
(2) ⇒ (1). Analogous. 2
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Alternative Proof. (1)⇒ (2) By contraposition, consider (Y ∗1 +pi1, ..., Y ∗m+
pim) ∈ A(X) which is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists (Z∗1 + pi1, ..., Z∗m +
pim) ∈ A(X) such that
[Y ∗i + pii -i Z∗i + pii] ∀i ∧ [∃ i ∈ {1, ...,m}s.t.Y ∗i + pii ≺i Z∗i + pii]
. By translation invariace of the total preorder -i we have that
Y ∗i -i Z∗i ∀i ∧ [∃ i ∈ {1, ...,m}s.t.Y ∗i ≺i Z∗i ].
Hence (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is not Pareto optimal.
(2) ⇒ (1). Analogous. 2
Corollary 4.3.5. Assume that -i is a translation invariant total preorder
for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} and let (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) be a Pareto optimal allocation.
Then (Y ∗1 +Z1, ..., Y ∗m +Zm) ∈ A(X) is also a Pareto optimal allocation provided
that the following condition holds for some uniquely determined m-tuple of real
numbers (pii, ..., pim) such that
Zi ∼i pii for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} and
m∑
i=1
pii = 0. (4.6)
Proof. We have that Y ∗i +Zi ∼i Y ∗i +pii, implying that also (Y ∗1 +Z1, ..., Y ∗m+
Zm) ∈ A(X) is Pareto Optimal from the above Proposition 4.3.4. 2
The existence of optimal allocations is guaranteed when there are Pareto
optimal allocations and -i has a translation invariant utility Ui for all i ∈
{1, ...,m}. This fact is illustrated in the following easy proposition.
Proposition 4.3.6. Assume that -i is a translation invariant total pre-
order for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} with a translation invariant utility function Ui. Let
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) be Pareto optimal. Then the following conditions are equiva-
lent for every m-tuple of real numbers (pii, ..., pim) such that
∑m
i=1 pii = 0:
1. (Y ∗1 + pi1, ..., Y ∗m + pim) ∈ A(X) is optimal;
2. Ui(Xi)− Ui(Y ∗i ) ≤ pii.
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Proof. Just consider that, under our assumptions, (Y ∗1 +pi1, ..., Y ∗m+pim) ∈ A(X)
is optimal if and only if, for all i ∈ {1, ...,m},
Ui(Xi) ≤ Ui(Y ∗i ) + pii = Ui(Y ∗i + pii).
2
Remark 4.3.7. In the case of individual total preorders with translation
invariant utilities, the above Proposition 4.3.6 guarantees that determining Pareto
optimal allocations is in fact equivalent to determining optimal solutions for every
choice of the initial exposures.
As we have previously already introduced, the problem concerning the
existence of Pareto optimal allocations can be related to the problem concerning
the existence of maximal elements for the coalition preorder - defined in (4.3).
The following proposition illustrates this possibility.
Proposition 4.3.8. For every risk X and for every feasible allocation
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is Pareto optimal;
(ii) (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is maximal for A(X) with respect to the coalition preorder
-= ⋂mi=1 -i.
Proof. (ii)⇒ (i). By contraposition, consider a feasible allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈
A(X) which is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ A(X) such
that:
[Y ∗i -i Y ′i ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Y ∗¯i ≺i Y ′¯i ].
Therefore,
[(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) - (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)] ∧ [¬((Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) - (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m))]
clearly implies that
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ≺ (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)
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. Hence, (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not maximal for -.
(i) ⇒ (ii). By contraposition, consider (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) which is not
maximal for -. Then there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ A(X) such that
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ≺ (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)
, and this is equivalent to require that
[(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) - (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)] ∧ [¬((Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) - (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m))]
with
¬[(Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) - (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m)] =
m⋃
i=1
[¬(Y ′i - Y ∗i )]
Hence, there exists i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} such that:
[Y ∗¯i -i¯ Y
′¯
i ] ∧ [¬(Y ′¯i -i¯ Y ∗¯i )]
clearly implies that
Y ∗¯i ≺i¯ Y ′¯i
. Therefore we have that
[Y ∗i -i Y ′i ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Y ∗¯i ≺i Y ′¯i ].
This means that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not Pareto optimal. 2
Remark 4.3.9. Please notice that the previous proposition does not require
any restrictive assumption on the preorders -i.
4.3.2 Characterization of optimal solutions
Until now we considered Pareto optimality of allocations in A(X) providing
the equivalence between Pareto optimality and maximality with respect to the
coalition preorder - on A(X).
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We now extend the previous considerations in order to study the existence of
optimal solutions, i.e., we study Pareto optimality in the set S of all the feasible
allocations for which each agent is at least as well as under the initial allocation
(X1, .., Xm) defined as follows:
S = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) | (X1, .., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)} (4.7)
As a natural extension of Proposition 4.3.8, we state the equivalence between
optimal solutions and maximal elements with respect to the coalition preorder -
on S.
Proposition 4.3.10. For every risk X and for every feasible allocation
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is Pareto optimal and individually rational;
(ii) (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is maximal for S with respect to the coalition preorder
-= ⋂mi=1 -i.
Proof. (ii)⇒ (i). By contraposition, consider a feasible allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈
A(X) which is not individually rational pareto optimal. This implies that
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) could be either pareto optimal (but not individually rational)
or not pareto optimal (but individually rational).
If (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is not pareto optimal (but individually rational),
there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ A(X) such that:
[Y ∗i -i Y ′i ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Y ∗¯i ≺i Y ′¯i ].
Since (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is individually rational, then also (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ A(X)
is individually rational. Therefore,
(Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ S
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So, (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) could not be maximal for S with respect to the coalition
preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i.
Consider now the case (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) be pareto optimal (but not
individually rational). From Proposition 4.3.8 (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) pareto optimal
implies that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is maximal forA(X) with respect to the coalition
preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i. Since (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is not individually rational, it
can’t be maximal for S.
(i) ⇒ (ii) analogous 2
4.3.3 Existence of optimal solutions
Let now L+ be a topological vector space. This is the case of a vector space
endowed with a topology which makes the vector operations continuous. Recall
that a normed space is always a topological vector space when we consider the
associated norm topology.
From Proposition 4.3.10, we can analyze the existence of maximal elements
for the coalition preorder to study the existence of optimal solutions.
In particular, we are going to consider the conditions for the existence of --
maximal elements for S = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) | (X1, .., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)}.
The following condition will be assumed:
A1: for every i and every Z ∈ A(X), i-i(Z) = {Y ∈ A(X) | Z -i Y } is τ -closed
(i.e., -i is upper semicontinuous for every i).
The following theorem provides sufficient topological conditions for the
existence of optimal solutions, by using the existence of maximal elements for
the coalition preorder.
Theorem 4.3.11. There exists a Pareto optimal and individually rational
element (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) of S = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) | (X1, .., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)},
where -= ⋂mi=1 -i is the coalition preorder on S, provided that -i is an upper
semicontinuous preorder for every i and the induced topology τmS on S is compact.
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Proof. From Proposition (4.3.10), it suffices to show that the coalition preorder
-= ⋂mi=1 -i on S has a maximal element. Since -i is an upper semicontinuous
preorder for every i, we have that also the coalition preorder - on S is upper
semicontinuous. Indeed, we have that
i-(Z) = i-((Z1, ..., Zm)) = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ S : (Z1, ..., Zm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)}
=
m⋂
i=1
i-i(Z)
is a closed subset of S for every Z ∈ S. Therefore, from Theorem 2.3.30, -
admits a maximal element. 2
Remark 4.3.12. If L+ is a metric space and a set A(X) is compact, we have
that A(X) is a compact metric space when we consider the product metric. There-
fore A(X) is separable, or equivalently second countable (see e.g.Engelking29).
Remark 4.3.13. Under particular assumptions, it is possible to apply the
Banach Alaoglu Theorem ( see 2.3.28), to provide the compactness of S, as stated
in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.14. The following condition will be assumed:
A1: for every i and every Z ∈ A(X), i-i(Z) = {Y ∈ A(X) | Z -i Y } is closed
in the weak* topology σ(L∞, L1).
A2: A(X) is closed in the weak* topology σ(L∞, L1).
Then, S is compact.
Proof. The set
A(X)|i = {Yi ∈ L+ : ∃ (Y1, .., Yi−1, Yi+1, .., Ym) s.t. (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ A(X)}
is a subset of the closed ball
B(0, ‖ X ‖)
that is compact in the weak* topology σ(L∞, L1) by the Banach Alaoglu Theorem
( see 2.3.28).
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The Thichonof theorem guarantees also the compactness in the product
topology. The set
S = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) | (X1, .., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)}
is clearly a subset of A(X). Since -i is σ(L∞, L1) upper semicontinuous preorder
for every i, then also - on S is σ(L∞, L1) upper semicontinuous preorder. Then,
S is a closed subset of a compact set, then it is compact. 2
Remark 4.3.15. It is clear that if we assume the compactness of A(X) instead
of S, Theorem 4.3.11 holds since S is a closed subset of the compact set A(X).
4.3.4 The multi-objective maximization problem
Let us now introduce the so calledmulti-objective maximization problem associated
to m real-valued functions U1, ..., Um (see e.g. Kaminski41)).
Definition 4.3.16. A solution to the problem
sup (U1(Y1), U2(Y2), ..., Um(Ym))
sub
(Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S (4.8)
is (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) provided that one of the following equivalent conditions hold:
1. for all (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S, Ui(Yi) ≥ Ui(Y ∗i ) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} imply Ui(Yi) =
Ui(Y ∗i ) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m};
2. for no (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S it holds that Ui(Yi) ≥ Ui(Y ∗i ) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}
with at least one strict inequality;
3. for all (Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S, if Ui(Yi) > Ui(Y ∗i ) for some i ∈ {1, ...,m}, then there
exists some j ∈ {1, ...,m} such that Uj(Yj) < Uj(Y ∗j ).
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In the following proposition we are going to use the previous concept in
order to produce sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal solution in
the risk sharing setting.
Proposition 4.3.17. Let Ui be an order-preserving function for the individual
preorder -i (i ∈ {1, ...,m}) on S. Then the following statements are valid:
1. If (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.8), then it is maximal for S
with respect to the coalition preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i;
2. If -i is a total preorder for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, then an optimal solution
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.8).
Proof. We prove statement 1. by contraposition. Assume that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m)
is not maximal for S with respect to the coalition preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i. Then
there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ S such that
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ≺ (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)
, and this is equivalent to require that
[(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) - (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)] ∧ [¬((Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) - (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m))]
with
¬[(Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) - (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m)] =
m⋃
i=1
[¬(Y ′i - Y ∗i )]
Hence, there exists i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} such that:
[Y ∗¯i -i¯ Y
′¯
i ] ∧ [¬(Y ′¯i -i¯ Y ∗¯i )]
clearly implies that
Y ∗¯i ≺i¯ Y ′¯i
. Therefore we have that
[Y ∗i -i Y ′i ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Y ∗¯i ≺i Y ′¯i ].
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Therefore, since Ui is an order-preserving function for -i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, it
is clear that
[Ui(Y ∗i ) ≤ Ui(Y ′i ) ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Ui¯(Y ∗¯i ) < Ui¯(Y ′¯i )]
contradicting the fact that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.8).
Statement 2. will be also proved by contraposition. Assume that -i is a total
preorder for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} and that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not a solution to the problem
(4.8). Then
[Ui(Y ∗i ) ≤ Ui(Y ′i ) ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Ui¯(Y ∗¯i ) < Ui¯(Y ′¯i )]
Since Ui is in this case a utility function for -i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, we have
that
[Y ∗i -i Y ′i ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Y ∗¯i ≺i Y ′¯i ].
contradicting the fact that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is optimal. This consideration completes
the proof. 2
From Proposition 4.3.10 we know that if (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is maximal for S with
respect to the coalition preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i then it is individually rational
pareto optimal.
So we can readapt Proposition 4.3.17 in this way:
Proposition 4.3.18. Let Ui be an order-preserving function for the individual
preorder -i (i ∈ {1, ...,m}) on S. Then the following statements are valid:
1. If (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.8), then it is an optimal
solution;
2. If -i is a total preorder for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}, then an optimal solution
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.8).
The following corollary concerning the case of total preorders and the
corresponding utilities is immediate and we omit its proof.
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Corollary 4.3.19. Let -i be a total preorder for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} and let Ui
be a utility function for -i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
1. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.8);
2. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is an optimal solution.
From Proposition 4.3.6 we know that in the case of individual total preorders
with translation invariant utilities, determining Pareto optimal allocations is in
fact equivalent to determining optimal allocations for every choice of the initial
exposures.
So, from Proposition 4.3.6 and Corollary 4.3.19, we can readapt Proposi-
tion 4.3.18 for the case of individual total preorders with translation invariant
utilities.
We start modifying the multi-objective optimization problem restricted on
A(X):
Definition 4.3.20.
sup (U1(Y1), U2(Y2), ..., Um(Ym))
sub
(Y1, .., Ym) ∈ A(X) (4.9)
Then we have the following Proposition:
Proposition 4.3.21. Let -i be a total preorders with translation invariant
utility Ui, (i ∈ {1, ...,m}) on A(X). Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (4.9);
2. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is an optimal solution.
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As we will see in the following chapter, the problem of multi-objective
maximization can be traduced to that of maximizing a single function, and under
particular conditions, the two problems coincide.
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5
The sup-convolution problem
In this chapter we introduce the sup-convolution problem, strictly related to
the multi-objective maximization problem analyzed in the previous chapter. We
characterize optimal solutions for both not necessarily total and total preorders.
Then, we study the case of agents making a choice over different risky outcomes
and then sharing the risks of the selected outcome.
5. The sup-convolution problem
5.1 Introduction
The sup-convolution problem is of help since it allows us to reduce the research
of optimal solutions to the maximization of a single function. In particular, in
the risk sharing context, the problem is to characterize optimal allocations of a
risk X to the m agents under all of the feasible allocations of X, i.e. under all
decompositions (Y1, ..., Ym) such that X =
∑m
i=1 Yi.
Since it is of interest the characterization of optimal solutions, we can
formulate the sup-convolution problem restricting our attention on the set S of
all the feasible allocations for which each agent is at least as well as under the
initial exposure.
Definition 5.1.1 (sup-convolution problem). The sup-convolution
problem relative to the functions U1, ..., Um on S is defined as follows
U1U2...Um(Y1, ..., Ym) = sup{
m∑
i=1
Ui(Yi)|X =
m∑
i=1
Yi.} (5.1)
The sup-convolution problem supports a rich literature, see for instance
Harsanyi,37 Wilson,51 Rubinstein,48 Borch,14 Aase,1 Filipovic and Kupper,31
Burgert and Rüschendorf,16 Barrieu and El Karoui,9 Jouni,38 Barrieu and Scan-
dolo.10
In such a context explained by Definition 5.1.1, the risk sharing problem
is related to the maximization of the "overall" utility of the m agents by some
kind of exchange contracts. There are several cases in literature concerning the
sup-convolution of utility functions in a risk sharing context, for example Filipovic
and Kupper31 and Jouini et al38 studied the problem of sup-convolution in the
case of monetary utility functions.
The sup-convolution problem is equivalently reduced to a inf-convolution
problem in the case where agents preferences are expressed by risk-functions ρi,
generally risk measures. In such a context, the inf-convolution problem represents
the value of the optimal risk-allocation problem formulation, interpreting the
problem of minimazing the total risk of a risk sharing contract.
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Definition 5.1.2 (inf-convolution problem). The inf-convolution
problem relative to the functions ρ1, ..., ρm on S is defined as follows
ρ1ρ2...ρm(Y1, ..., Ym) = inf{
m∑
i=1
ρi(Yi)|X =
m∑
i=1
Yi.} (5.2)
In literature we can find several cases concerning the problem of reducing a
maximization of "overall" utility to a inf-convolution setting.
In particular, Barrieu and El Karoui9 studied the problem of maximizing
the aggregate expected utility of two agents having access to a financial market
to reduce their risk. This problem is equivalently traduced in a more general
framework involving convex risk measures and their inf-convolution.
Similarly, Burgert and Rüschendorf16 studied the optimal risk allocation
problem or equivalently the problem of risk sharing with m agents endowed
with risk measures {ρ1, .., ρm}, in particular convex risk measures and their inf-
convolution. The problem of minimizing the total risk of a risk sharing contract
can be considered as an optimistic attitude towards risk, typical for insurance and
reinsurance contracts. As opposite, Burgert and Rüschendorf16 considered also
the case of a "cautious" risk attitude where the problem of optimal risk allocation
is reduced to maximizing the total risk in the worst case. In other terms, from
a regulatory point of view, the risk measures should be chosen by the traders
(agents) in a most cautious way in order not to underestimate the whole risk.
In the following section we are going to study the sup-convolution problem
to characterize optimal solutions for the risk-sharing setting, in particular con-
sidering the equivalence between solutions to the sup-convolution problem and
the solutions of the multi-objective optimization problem defined in the previous
chapter.
We start considering agents preferences expressed by not necessarily total
preorders. Then we consider optimal solutions considering agents preferences
represented by total preorders. In particular, as we have already justified in
the previous chapter, the case of individual total preorders -i with transla-
tion invariant utility functions Ui is particularly favorable since it characterize
the equivalence between pareto optimal allocations and optimal solutions and
guarantees that Ui is an upper semicontinuous utility function for an upper
semicontinuous total preorder.
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In the last section we study the problem of risk sharing in the presence of
different risky outcomes. This problem is of interest for example in the case of
building-projects selection exposed to catastrophic events. In such a context, the
m agents select different risky outcomes and then share the potential risks of
the selected project. This problem will be referred to the existence of maximal
elements for a not necessarily total coalition preorder. Under particular assump-
tions that guarantee the existence of the sup-convolution for every risky outcome,
the coalition preorder is total and the related utility function is the associated
sup-convolution.
5.2 Characterization of optimal solutions
In this section we are going to characterize optimal solutions based on the solution
of the sup-convolution problem.
We start considering agents preferences endowed with not necessarily total
preorders and we exploit the equivalence between the sup- convolution problem
and the multi-objective optimization problem of the previous chapter in the case
when the individual preorders are expressed by order preserving functions.
As a natural extension of the latter considerations, we consider the case of
individual preorders expressed by upper semicontinuous order preserving functions
or a finite upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation.
Then we study the case of agents preferences endowed with total preorders,
guaranteeing the existence of upper semicontinuous utility functions for the upper
semicontinuous total preorders.
5.2.1 Optimal solutions for not necessarily total preorders
In this paragraph we consider the correlations between the characterization of
optimal solutions for not necessarily total preorders obtained in the previous
chapter and the sup-convolution problem introduced in the thesis-introduction.
It is clear that a solution to the sup-convolution problem 5.1.1 is also a
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solution to the multi-objective optimization problem 4.8. From Proposition 4.3.18,
statement 1, and this latter consideration, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2.1. If Ui is an order-preserving function for -i for every
i ∈ {1, ...,m}, then a solution (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) to the sup-convolution problem (5.1)
is optimal.
A simple characterization of an order preserving function based on the
Choquet integral is provided in the following example (see Bosi and Zuanon).15)
Example 5.2.2. Consider the following example concerning decision theory
under uncertainty. Let M = {µn : n ∈ {1, . . . , n∗}} be a finite family of concave
capacities on a measurable space (Ω,A), with Ω the state space, and A a σ-algebra
of subsets of Ω. We recall that a capacity µ on A (i.e., a function from A into
[0, 1] such that µ(∅) = 0, µ(Ω) = 1, and µ(A) ≤ µ(B) for all A ⊆ B, A,B ∈ A)
is said to be concave if for all sets A,B ∈ A,
µ(A ∪B) + µ(A ∩B) ≤ µ(A) + µ(B)
(see e.g. Chateauneuf 19). Consider the normed space L1(Ω,A, µn) of all the real
random variables x such that the Choquet integral∫
Ω
xdµ =
∫ ∞
0
µ({x ≥ t})dt+
∫ 0
−∞
(µ({x ≥ t})− 1)dt
is finite (see e.g. Denneberg27). Define a binary relation on L1 as follows:
Yi -i Y ′i if and only if
∫
Ω
Yidµn ≤
∫
Ω
Y ′i dµn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , n∗}.
It is clear that -i is a preorder and that -i is not complete in general. Then the
real-valued function u defined by
u(x) =
n∗∑
n=1
∫
Ω
Yidµn
is an order-preserving function for -i.
A simple adaptation of the arguments above leads to the following proposition
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concerning the case when every individual preorder has a finite multi-utility
representation.
Proposition 5.2.3. Assume that for every i ∈ {1, ...,m} there exists a finite
multi-utility representation Ui = {Ui,j : j = 1, ..., ki} for -i. Then a solution to
the sup-convolution problem
U1,1...U1,k1U2,1...Um,1...Um,km(Y1, ..., Ym) =
= sup
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Ui,j(Yi); (5.3)
is a Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof. By contraposition, let the solution (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) of the sup-
convolution problem be not Pareto Optimal. Then there exists an allocation
(Z1, ..., Zm) ∈ A(X) such that Y ∗i -i Zi for i ∈ {1, ..,m} and Y ∗i ≺i Zi for some
i, with:
Y ∗i -i Zi ⇔ Ui,j(Y ∗i ) ≤ Ui,j(Zi) j ∈ {1, ..., ki}
and
Y ∗i ≺i Zi ⇔ Ui,j(Y ∗i ) ≤ Ui,j(Zi) for j ∈ {1, ..., ki} and Ui,j¯(Y ∗i ) < Ui,j¯(Zi).
Hence,
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Ui,j(Zi) >
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Ui,j(Y ∗i )
that is a contraddiction because (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is the solution of the sup-convolution
problem. 2
Remark 5.2.4. A finite multi-utility (or equivalently multi-risk) setting is
useful to fully describe agents behaviour over multiple regulatory requirements. In
such a context, in fact, each agent is equipped with multiple individual functions
where some of them may reflect her own preferences and other are regulatory
requirements.
Example 5.2.5. Note that Example 5.2.2 outlines a finite multi-utility repre-
sentation for the preorder -i based on a finite family of concave capacities. In
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fact if we call
Ui,j =
∫
Ω
Yidµj
Then we have:
Yi -i Y ′i ⇔ Ui,j(Yi) ≤ Ui,j(Y ′i ) ∀ Ui,j ∈ Ui
In the particular case when the distortion function is the identity function,
the previous finite multi-utility representation is in particular a finite expected
multi-utility representation. For a complete characterization of the existence of
an expected multi-utility representation see Dubra et al.28 and Evren.30
We want now to use the previous considerations in parallel with the assump-
tion of compactness of the set S of all the feasible allocations for which each
agent is at least as well as under the initial exposure in order to characterize the
existence of optimal solutions by using the sup-convolution.
As an easy consequence of Proposition 5.2.1 and Theorem 4.3.11, since the
sum of upper semicontinuous functions is itself upper semicontinuous, we have
that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5.2.6. If for every i ∈ {1, ...,m} there exists an upper semicon-
tinuous order-preserving function Ui for -i, then there exists an optimal solution
that is obtained as a solution (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) to the sup-convolution problem (5.1),
provided that the induced topology τmS on S is compact.
Further, the following proposition holds, which concerns the case when every
individual prorder has a finite upper semicontinuous multi-utility representa-
tion.
Proposition 5.2.7. If for every i ∈ {1, ...,m} there exists a finite upper
semicontinuous multi-utility representation Ui = {Ui,j : j = 1, ..., ki} for -i, then
there exists an optimal solution that is obtained as a solution (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) to the
sup-convolution problem
U1,1...U1,k1U2,1...U2,k2..Um,1...Um,km(Y1, ..., Ym) =
= sup
m∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
Ui,j(Yi), (5.4)
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provided that the induced topology τmS on S is compact.
5.2.2 Optimal solutions for total preorders
As we have already justified in the previous chapter, the case of individual
total preorders -i with translation invariant utility functions Ui is particularly
favorable since it characterize the equivalence between pareto optimal allocations
and optimal solutions.
If in addition we consider the case that the utility function Ui is also
comonotone superadditive, then Pareto optima and the solutions to the sup-
convolution problem coincide, in this way completing a well known result from
the literature according to which the two problems conicide in case that all
the functions are translation invariant (see for instance Acciaio2). Indeed, the
following theorem holds true.
Proposition 5.2.8. Assume that -i is a total preorder for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the sup-convolution problem (5.1);
2. (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a Pareto optimal allocation.
provided for every i ∈ {1, ...,m} there is a utility function Ui for -i satisfying
one of the following two conditions:
1. Ui is translation invariant;
2. Ui is comonotone superadditive, positively homogeneous and normalized.
Proof. 1. ⇒ 2.. Obvious.
2. ⇒ 1.. By contraposition, assume that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not a solution to
the sup-convolution problem (5.4). Therefore, there exists a feasible allocation
(Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) such that
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y ∗i ) <
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y ′i ).
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Define α = ∑mi=1 Ui(Y ′i ) −∑mi=1 Ui(Y ∗i ). Further, define, for all indexes i,
αi = Ui(Y ′i )− Ui(Y ∗i ). Let κ be the cardinality of {i : Ui(Y ′i )− Ui(Y ∗i ) 6= 0}.
Consider now a new feasible allocation (Y ′′1 , ..., Y ′′m) defined as follows:
Y
′′
i =
{
Y
′
i if αi = 0
Y ′i − αi + ακ if αi 6= 0
.
Then we have that
Ui(Y
′′
i ) =
{
Ui(Y ∗i ) = Ui(Y
′
i ) if αi = 0
Ui(Y ′i − αi + ακ ) ≥ Ui(Y ∗i ) + ακ > Ui(Y ∗i ) if αi 6= 0
.
Therefore the allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not Pareto optimal. 2
Example 5.2.9. As we have already justified in chapter 3, a classical example
of translation invariant, comonotone superadditive, positively homogeneous and
normalized functional U on L∞+ (Ω,F ,P) is provided by the Choquet integral with
respect to a convex probability distortion (i.e., with respect to µ = g ◦ P with g
convex).
The following theorem also concerns the case of translation invariant total
preorders with translation invariant utilities. We show that in this case the upper
semicontinuity of the individual preorders implies the upper semicontinuity of
the utilities.
Theorem 5.2.10. Let - be an upper semicontinuous total preorder on L. If U
is any translation invariant utility function for -, then U is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Let U be any translation invariant utility function for -, and consider
any X ∈ L and α > 0 such that U(X) < α. The proposition is proved as soon
as we are able to find an open subset O of X such that U(Z) < α for all Z ∈ O.
Then there exists c ∈ R such that
U(X) < U(X) + c < α
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, which, from translation invariance of U , is equivalent to
U(X) < U(X + c) < α
. Hence,
l-(X + c) = {Z ∈ L | Z ≺ X + c}
is an open subset of L such that U(Z) < U(X + c) < α for every Z ∈ l-(X + c).
This consideration finishes the proof. 2
As a consequence of Proposition 5.2.8 and Theorem 5.2.10, we get the
following nice result.
Theorem 5.2.11. Assume that, for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}, the preorder -i is
total, translation invariant and upper semicontinuous. If Ui is any translation
invariant utility function for -i (i ∈ {1, ...,m}, and the feasible set A(X) is
compact, then for any initial allocation (X1, ..., Xm) ∈ A(X) the set of all the
optimal solutions is nonempty and it coincides with the solution of the associated
sup-convolution problem
U1U2...Um(Y1, ..., Ym) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Yi). (5.5)
.
We end this paragraph considering the particularly favorable case of assuming
the feasible set A(X) to be a metric space. This allows us to guarantee that
upper semicontinuous total preorder on a subset of A(X) admits an upper
semicontinuous utility representation.
Theorem 5.2.12. Assume that, for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}, the preorder -i is
total, upper semicontinuous on S and A(X) is a compact metric space. Then
every preorder -i admits an upper semicontinuous utility representation Ui and
every solution of the problem
U1U2...Um(Y1, ..., Ym) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Yi). (5.6)
is optimal.
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Proof. A(X) is a compact metric space, and therefore it is in particular a
separable metric space (see e.g. Engelking [29 Theorem 4.1.18]). Then the subset
S of A(X) can be metrized as a separable metric space, and therefore as a second
countable metric space (see e.g. Engelking [29 Corollary 4.1.16]). Since each
preorder -i is an upper semicontinuous total preorder on S, then -i admits
an upper semicontinuous utility function Ui by Rader’s theorem (see Rader [46
Theorem 1]). Therefore, every solution to the sup-convolution problem is optimal.
2
Remark 5.2.13. The ball B(0, ‖X‖) is metrizable in the weak* topology. (see
e.g. J.B. Conway20 Exercise 4, p.136 on else the proof of 6.34 Theorem, p.254, in
Aliprantis and Border5)
5.2.3 The inf-convolution problem
We finish this section by observing that Pareto optimal risk sharing is consider
from the point of view of risk minimization better that utility maximization.
This means that individual risk measures ρi are considered instead of individual
utilities Ui. In order to use the previous arguments and results, we only have to
define Ui = −ρi (i = 1, ...,m).
In this framework, the definition of a Pareto optimal allocation under risk is
perfectly symmetrical with respect to the definition of a Pareto optimal allocation
(see Definition 4.2.2).
Definition 5.2.14 (Pareto optimal allocation under risk). An allocation
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) is said to be Pareto optimal under risk if for no other
allocation (Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) it occurs that Y1 -i Y ∗1 , ..., Ym -m Y ∗m with at
least one index i such that Y1 ≺i Y ∗i .
Finally, the sup-convolution problem 5.1.1 is therefore replaced by the
following inf-convolution problem.
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Definition 5.2.15 (inf-convolution problem). The inf-convolution
problem relative to the functions ρ1, ..., ρm on S is defined as follows
ρ1ρ2...ρm(Y1, ..., Ym) = inf
m∑
i=1
ρi(Yi). (5.7)
As we have anticipated in the previous introduction, there is an extensive
literature related to risk-redistribution problems obtained by inf-convolution of
the associated risk measures of the m agents. The introduction of the Basel II
regulation and the Swiss Solvency Test (SST), in fact, has increased the use of
risk measures to evaluate financial or insurance risk.
In particular, the inf-convolution problem can traduce the maximization of
the overall utility of the agents. For example in a risk-redistribution context where
agents preferences are represented by distortion risk measures, each distortion
risk measure can represented as a vN-M expected utility function if and only if
the distortion function is given by the identity function, i.e., if the risk measure
is risk-neutral.
In such a context (see for instance Boonen13), given a finite number m of
agents (agencies), each of them is endowed with a risk Xi and a distortion risk
measure ρi that depends on a distortion function gi. The set of risk redistribution
is as usual the set of all the feasible shares (Y1, ..., Ym) such that
∑
Xi =
∑
Yi.
The set of risk redistribution allows for example proportional or stop loss contract
on the aggregate risk.
Following definition 5.2.15, a risk redistribution is called Pareto optimal
if there does not exist another feasible redistribution that is weakly better for
all firms, and strictly better for at least one firm. Then, as usual in the inf-
convolution problems, the set of Pareto optimal risk redistributions is given by
the set of all feasible risk redistributions such that the aggregate risk value is
minimal.
It is clear that in the case of Pareto optimality under risk we state the
equivalence between optimal allocations under risk and minimal elements with
respect to the coalition preorder. Therefore, in this case we need to provide the
lower semicontinuity of the individual preorders.
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5.3 Preferences over different risky outcomes
5.3.1 Introduction
Until now we considered the case of m agents (agencies) partecipating in sharing
a risk X and we reduced the problem of characterizing optimal solutions to that
of maximizing a single function ( the sup convolution problem).
We are now interested on considering the case in which agents have to make
a choice between different risky outcomes, and then share the risks of the selected
outcome. For example, consider the case of cooperative investments projects in
construction or agriculture under the risks of natural hazards and disasters. In
this case, agents with different risky attitudes have to make a choice over different
risky projects and then share the potential losses ( earthquakes, hurricanes,.. )
of the selected project.
For every risk Xh on L+, we define as usual the set of all the possible feasible
allocations of Xh shared by the m agents.
Definition 5.3.1 (feasible allocations). For every risk Xh, denote by A(Xh)
the set of all the Xh-feasible allocations of Xh, i.e. the set
A(Xh) = {(Y1, ..., Ym) | Xh =
m∑
j=1
Yj}. (5.8)
It is necessary now to define a way the coalition of m agents make a decision
over different risks comparing all the possible feasible allocations of the risks.
5.3.2 Coalition preorder
We shall refer to the work of Grechuk et al.36 modifying the definition of coalition
preorder to incorporate the social preorder (4.3). Given an arbitrary set of
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random variables(risky outcomes) from L+ we can now introduce a preference
relation -C for the coalition of m-agencies in this way:
Definition 5.3.2 (coalition preorder over risky outcomes). Given two risky-
outcomes X1 and X2, we say that X1 -C X2 if for every X1-feasible allocation
(Y 11 , ..., Y 1m) ∈ A(X1) there exists a X2-feasible allocation (Y 21 , ..., Y 2m) ∈ A(X2)
such that Y 1i -i Y 2i for all i ∈ {1, ..m}.
It is clear that
(X1 ≺C X2)⇔ (X1 -C X2) ∧ ¬(X2 -C X1)
where ¬(X2 -C X1) implies that there exists aX2 feasible allocation (Y 21 , ..., Y 2m) ∈
A(X2) that is not dominated by any X1-feasible allocation (Y 11 , ..., Y 1m) ∈ A(X1).
So, we say (X1 ≺C X2) if for every X1-feasible allocation (Y 11 , ..., Y 1m) ∈
A(X1) there exists a X2-feasible allocation (Y 21 , ..., Y 2m) ∈ A(X2) such that
(Y 11 , ..., Y 1m) - (Y 21 , ..., Y 2m) and there exists a X1-feasible allocation (Y 11 , ..., Y 1m) ∈
A(X1) and aX2-feasible allocation (Y 21 , ..., Y 2m) ∈ A(X2) such that (Y 11 , ..., Y 1m) ≺
(Y 21 , ..., Y 2m).
By definition, -C is clearly not total in general, so we can traduce the
problem of making a choice between different risky outcomes by studying the
conditions that guarantee the existence of maximal elements for a not necessary
total preorder, i.e. the coalition preorder -C .
It is possible now to define a maximal element with respect to the coalition
preorder -C .
Definition 5.3.3 (maximal elements). We say that Xh is maximal with
respect to the coalition preorder -C , if for no other Xk it occurs that:
Xh ≺C Xk
It is clear that a maximal element Xh is the best preferred risky outcome
by the coalition of m agents.
It is intuitive to define a comparison between different risky outcomes
considering the associated optimal solution provided optimal solution exists. In
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fact we know that, for every Xh, a solution of the sup-convolution problem
UC(Xh) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y ii )
sub
(Y h1 , .., Y hm) ∈ A(Xh) (5.9)
is an optimal allocation for Xh.
So, we can now introduce the following optimization problem:
sup UC(X) (5.10)
A solution of (5.10) is the outcome Xh ∈ L+ which has the greatest sup-
convolution.
In the following proposition we are going to use the previous concept in
order to find a maximal element for the coalition preorder -C .
Proposition 5.3.4. Let Ui be a translation invariant utility function for the
individual total preorder -i (i ∈ {1, ...,m}). Then the following statements are
equivalent:
1. Xh is a solution to the problem (5.10);
2. Xh is maximal w.r.t. the coalition preorder -C .
Proof. 2 ⇒ 1. Assume that Xh is not a solution to the problem (5.10).
Then there exists a risky outcome Xk such that:
UC(Xh) < UC(Xk)
This implies that there exists a Xh-feasible allocation (Y h1 , ..., Y hm) ∈ A(Xh)
and a Xk-feasible allocation (Y k1 , ..., Y km) ∈ A(Xk) such that:
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y hi ) <
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y ki )
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It is possible now to define a Xk-feasible allocation (Z1, ...Zm) that dominates
(Y h1 , ..., Y hm), clearly implying Xh is not maximal w.r.t the coalition preorder
-C :
Zi = Y ki − Ui(Y ki ) + Ui(Y hi ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y ki )−
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )
m
i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Note that ∑mi=1 Zi = ∑mi=1 Y ki = Xk. Then,
Ui(Zi) = Ui(Y hi ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y ki )−
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )
m
> Ui(Y hi ) i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Since Ui is a utility function for the total preorder -i, we have that:
Ui(Zi) > Ui(Y hi )⇔ Y hi ≺i Zi, i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Then Xh is not maximal w.r.t the coalition preorder -C :
1 ⇒ 2. Consider now the case Xh is a solution to the problem (5.10). Then,
for every risk Xk there exists a Xh-feasible allocation (Y h1 , ..., Y hm) such that:
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y hi ) ≥ UC(Xk)
Consider now the allocation (Y ∗k1 , ..., Y ∗km ) that is solution to UC(Xk). Then we
can define a Xh-feasible allocation (Z1, ..., Zm) in this way:
Zi = Y hi − Ui(Y hi ) + Ui(Y ∗ki ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )− UC(Xk)
m
i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Note that ∑mi=1 Zi = ∑mi=1 Y ki = Xk. Then,
Ui(Zi) = Ui(Y ∗ki ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )− UC(Xk)
m
≥ Ui(Y ∗ki ) i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Then, for every Xk-feasible allocation (Y k1 , ..., Y km) the relation:
Ui(Y ki ) > Ui(Y ∗ki ) i ∈ {1, ...,m}
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is an absurd and
Ui(Y ki ) ≥ Ui(Y ∗ki ) i ∈ {1, ...,m}
clearly implies
Ui(Y ki ) = Ui(Y ∗ki )
Then, no Xk feasible allocation can dominate (Z1, ..., Zm). 2
From these considerations, we can introduce the conditions that allow the
coalition preorder -C to be total. Note that -C in not necessary total in general
as we described in the previous paragraph.
Proposition 5.3.5. Let Ui be a translation invariant utility function for the
individual total preorder -i (i ∈ {1, ...,m}). Then, given
UC(Xh) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y hi )
sub
(Y h1 , .., Y hm) ∈ A(Xh) (5.11)
for every risky outcomes Xh, we have that
Xh -C Xk ⇔ UC(Xh) ≤ UC(Xk) (5.12)
for every risky outcomes Xh and Xk.
Proof. Let UC(Xh) ≤ UC(Xk). Then, for every Xh-feasible allocation
(Y h1 , ..., Y hm) ∈ A(Xh) there exists a Xk-feasible allocation (Y k1 , ..., Y km) ∈ A(Xk)
such that
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y hi ) ≤
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y ki )
Consider now the Xk-feasible allocation (Z1, ..., Zm) such that
∑m
i=1 Zi = Xk,
defined in this way:
Zi = Y ki − Ui(Y ki ) + Ui(Y hi ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y ki )−
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )
m
i ∈ {1, ...,m}
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Note that ∑mi=1 Zi = ∑mi=1 Y ki = Xk. Then,
Ui(Zi) = Ui(Y hi ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y ki )−
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )
m
≥ Ui(Y hi ) i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Since Ui is a utility function for the total preorder -i, we have that:
Ui(Zi) ≥ Ui(Y hi )⇔ Y hi -i Zi, i ∈ {1, ...,m}
With
Y hi -i Zi, i ∈ {1, ...,m} ⇔ (Y h1 , .., Y hm) - (Z1, ..., Zm)
So, we prooved that for every Xh-feasible allocation (Y h1 , ..., Y hm) ∈ A(Xh) there
exists a Xk-feasible allocation (Z1, ..., Zm) such that (Y h1 , .., Y hm) - (Z1, ..., Zm).
Then Xh -C Xk.
We want to prove now that Xh -C Xk ⇒ UC(Xh) ≤ UC(Xk). By contra-
position, suppose UC(Xh) > UC(Xk). Then, there exists a Xk-feasible allocation
(Y k1 , ..., Y km) ∈ A(Xk) and a Xh-feasible allocation (Y h1 , ..., Y hm) ∈ A(Xh) such
that
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y hi ) >
m∑
i=1
Ui(Y ki )
Let consider the latter 2 feasible allocations for which the inequility of the
associated sup convolution is strict. Consider now the Xh-feasible allocation
(Z1, ..., Zm) such that
∑m
i=1 Zi = Xh, defined in this way:
Zi = Y hi − Ui(Y hi ) + Ui(Y ki ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )−
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y ki )
m
i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Note that ∑mi=1 Zi = ∑mi=1 Y hi = Xh. Then,
Ui(Zi) = Ui(Y ki ) +
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y hi )−
∑m
i=1 Ui(Y ki )
m
> Ui(Y ki ) i ∈ {1, ...,m}
Since Ui is a utility function for the total preorder -i, we have that:
Ui(Zi) > Ui(Y ki )⇔ Y ki ≺i Zi, i ∈ {1, ...,m}
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Then:
¬(Xh -C Xk)
2
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6
Comonotonicity and
efficient risk sharing
In this chapter we are going to re-adapt the main propositions and theorems of the
previous chapters restricting our attention to the set of comonotone allocations in
order to study the existence of individually rational pareto optimal comonotone
allocations.
6. Comonotonicity and efficient risk sharing
6.1 Introduction
The concept of comonotonicity is actually a robust tool for solving several research
and practical problems in capital allocation and risk sharing.
The main result related to application of comonotonicity in risk sharing
is originally due to Landsberger and Meilijson42 who states that any allocation
is dominated by a comonotone one if agents’ preferences agree with second
stochastic dominance. This result was originally obtained for the discrete case
of two agents and then extended to more general cases. This domination result
could be expressed by the following Proposition ( see Dana22 ):
Proposition 6.1.1. Any allocation in A(X) is -SSD dominated by a comono-
tone allocation in A(X). If the allocation is not comonotone, then there exists a
comonotone allocation that strictly dominates it.
Recall the following definition for the case of consistency with respect to
second stochastic dominance.
Definition 6.1.2. -i is (strictly) consistent with respect to second stochastic
dominance (namely risk averter) if
(Yi -SSD Y ′i ⇒ Yi -i Y ′i ) ∧ (Yi ≺SSD Y ′i ⇒ Yi ≺i Y ′i )
As we will see in this chapter, if we introduce the set of comonotone and
feasible allocations:
C = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X) : (Y1, ..., Ym) comonotone}
the domination result (Proposition 6.1.1) allows us to reformulate the multi-
objective maximization problem (4.8) in the following form:
sup (U1(Y1), U2(Y2), ..., Um(Ym))
sub
(Y1, .., Ym) ∈ C′ (6.1)
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where
• C′ = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ C : (X1, ..., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)} is the set of individually
rational comonotone and feasible allocations,
• -= ⋂mi=1 -i is the coalition preorder and -i preserves second stochastic
dominance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m},
• Ui(Yi) is an order preserving function for the individual preorder -i for all
i ∈ {1, ..,m}.
6.2 Existence of optimal solutions
In this paragraph we study the existence of individually rational Pareto op-
timal allocations (optimal solutions) restricting our attention on comonotone
allocations.
From Proposition 4.3.8 we know that the problem concerning the existence of
Pareto optimal allocations can be related to the problem concerning the existence
of maximal elements for the coalition preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i. This result was
obtained for every riskX and for every feasible allocation (Y ∗1 , .., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X). We
just want now to readapt this proposition to the case of finding maximal elements
for the coalition preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i defined on the set C′ = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈
A(X ) : (X1, ..., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym), (Y1, ..., Ym) comonotone} of individually
rational comonotone and feasible allocations, with the further assumption that
-i preserves second stochastic dominance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m}. We start from the
following proposition:
Proposition 6.2.1. For every risk X and for every feasible allocation
(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X) the following condition holds:
(i) if (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is maximal with respect to the coalition preorder -=⋂m
i=1 -i defined on the set C = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ A(X ) : (Y1, ..., Ym) comonotone}
93
6. Comonotonicity and efficient risk sharing
of comonotone and feasible allocations, and -i preserves second stochastic domi-
nance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m}, then (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is Pareto optimal.
Proof. By contraposition, consider a feasible allocation (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ∈ A(X)
which is not Pareto optimal. Then, by the domination result, (Proposition 6.1.1),
there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ C(X) such that:
[Y ∗i -SSD Y ′i i ∈ {1, ...,m}] ∧ [ ∃ i¯ ∈ {1, ...,m} s.t. Y ∗¯i ≺SSD Y ′¯i ]
Since -i preserves second stochastic dominance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m}, then:
[(Y ∗i -SSD Y ′i )⇒ (Y ∗i -i Y ′i ) ] ∧ [(Y ∗¯i ≺SSD Y ′¯i )⇒ (Y ∗i ≺i Y ′i )]
Therefore, there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ C(X) such that
[(Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) - (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m)] ∧ [¬((Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) - (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m)]
clearly implies that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) ≺ (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m). Hence, (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not maximal
in C for -. 2
This proposition allows us to study the existence of Pareto Optimal alloca-
tions by finding maximal elements for the coalition preorder -= ⋂mi=1 -i with
-i preserving second stochastic dominance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m}.
In particular, we are interested on finding an individually rational Pareto
optimal comonotone allocation. Therefore, we can adapt the previous proposition
to the case of studiyng the existence of maximal elements for the set:
C′ = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ C : (X1, ..., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)}
with -= ⋂mi=1 -i and -i preserves second stochastic dominance for all i ∈
{1, ..,m}.
From Proposition 6.2.1, finding maximal elements for C′ is equivalent to
finding an individually rational Pareto optimal comonotone allocation.
94
6.2. Existence of optimal solutions
The following theorem provides sufficient topological conditios for the ex-
istence of individually rational pareto optimal comonotone allocations. The
following conditions will be assumed:
A1: for every i and every Z ∈ A(X), i-i(Z) = {Y ∈ A(X) | Z -i Y } is τ -closed
(i.e., -i is upper semicontinuous for every i),
A2: -i preserves second stochastic dominance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m}.
Theorem 6.2.2. There exists a Pareto optimal and individually rational
element (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) of C′ = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ C : (X1, ..., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)},
where -= ⋂mi=1 -i is the coalition preorder on C′, provided that -i is an upper
semicontinuous preorder and preserves second stochastic dominance for every i,
and the induced topology τmC′ on C′ is compact.
As we already anticipated in the introduction of this chapter, we can re-
formulate the so called multi-objective maximization problem (4.8) and the sup-
convolution problems (5.1) in the following forms:
sup (U1(Y1), U2(Y2), ..., Um(Ym))
sub
(Y1, .., Ym) ∈ C′ (6.2)
where
• C′ = {(Y1, ..., Ym) ∈ C : (X1, ..., Xm) - (Y1, ..., Ym)} is the set of individually
rational comonotone and feasible allocations,
• -= ⋂mi=1 -i is the coalition preorder and -i preserves second stochastic
dominance for all i ∈ {1, ..,m},
• Ui(Yi) is an order preserving function for the individual preorder -i for all
i ∈ {1, ..,m}.
Definition 6.2.3. The sup-convolution problem relative to the functions
U1, ..., Um on C′ is defined as follows
U1U2...Um(Y1, ..., Ym) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Yi). (6.3)
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Then, we can adapt the main propositions of the thesis with the previous
concepts in order to produce sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal
solution in the risk-sharing setting under comonotone allocations.
Proposition 6.2.4. Let Ui be an order-preserving function for the individ-
ual preorder -i (i ∈ {1, ...,m}) on C′, and let -i preserves second stochastic
dominance for every i . Then the following statement is valid:
1. If (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (6.2), then it is an optimal
solution.
Proof. By contraposition, assume that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is not an optimal
solution. Then there exists (Y ′1 , ..., Y ′m) ∈ C′ such that Y ∗i -SSD Y ′i for all
i ∈ {1, ...,m} with one strict inequality. Since -i preserves second stochastic
dominance for every i we have that Y ∗i -i Y ′i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} with one strict
inequality. Since Ui is an order-preserving function for -i for all i ∈ {1, ...,m},
it is clear that Ui(Y ∗i ) ≤ Ui(Y ′i ) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} with one strict inequality,
contradicting the fact that (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) is a solution to the problem (6.2). 2
Proposition 6.2.5. If Ui is an order-preserving function for -i for every
i ∈ {1, ...,m} and -i preserves second stochastic dominance for every i , then a
solution (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) to the sup-convolution problem (6.3) is optimal.
Proposition 6.2.6. If for every i ∈ {1, ...,m} there exists an upper semicon-
tinuous order-preserving function Ui for -i, and -i preserves second stochastic
dominance for every i, then there exists an optimal solution that is obtained as
a solution (Y ∗1 , ..., Y ∗m) to the sup-convolution problem (6.3), provided that the
induced topology τC′ on C′ is compact.
We can recall some results from the literature used to solve the previous
problems in particular topological context. In this sense, the case of non-atomic
space is particularly favorable. Recall the definition of non-atomic probability
space as follows:
Definition 6.2.7. We say that a probability space (Ω;F ;P) is non-atomic,
or alternatively call P non-atomic if P (A) > 0 implies the existence of B ∈ F ,
B ⊂ A with 0 < P (B) < P (A).
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These are the results obtained in Carlier et al.18 and Dana22 for the case of
non atomic space:
Lemma 6.2.8. (Carlier et al.18) If the state space is non-atomic, then the
set of comonotone allocations of X is convex and compact in L∞ up to zero-sum
translations (which means that it can be written as):
C = {(λ1, ...., λm) s.t.
m∑
i=1
λi = 0}+A0
with A0 compact in L∞. In particular, the set of comonotone allocations of X is
closed in L∞.
Proposition 6.2.9. (Dana22) Let the state space be non-atomic, and u :
L∞ → R be concave and ‖‖∞ upper semicontinuous. Then:
• u is σ(L∞, L1) upper semicontinuous
• u is SSD preserving if and only if u is law invariant and monotone.
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Conclusions
The existence of optimal solutions to the problem of optimal risk sharing
is generally treated in the literature by considering the usual requirement of
completeness over decision makers’ preferences. Optimality in our context stands
for Pareto optimality and individual rationality. This means that there is no
other allocation such that all agents are better off with respect to their initial
exposures and at least one agent is strictly better off.
In this work we present several conditions for the existence of optimal so-
lutions starting from the assessment of the individual preferences expressed by
not necessarily total preorders -i. In particular we define a coalition preorder
(4.3) representing the attitude of all the agents to prefer an allocation to another
one, and we prove (Proposition 4.3.10) the equivalence between optimality and
maximality with respect to the coalition preorder.
Proposition 4.3.10 does not require any restrictive assumption on the pre-
orders -i, and this consideration validates our assessment of the individual
preferences expressed by not necessarily total preorders. In particular, Proposi-
tion 4.3.10 allows us to traduce the problem of finding optimal solutions to that
of studying the existence of maximal elements for a not necessarily total coalition
preorder.
The concepts of upper semicontinuity of a preorder (Definition 2.3.2) on
a topological space is in this sense fundamental in order to prove the existence
of maximal elements for the coalition preorder. We proved the so called "Folk
theorem" (Theorem 2.3.30) based on the Zorn’s Lemma (Lemma 2.3.29), which
guarantees the existence of a maximal element for every (not necessarily total)
preorder on a compact set provided that the preorder is upper semicontinuous.
These considerations are traduced in Theorem 4.3.11, that guarantees the exis-
tence of an optimal solution provided that -i is an upper semicontinuous preorder
for every i and the induced topology τS on the set S ( of all the feasible allocations
for which each agent is at least as well as under the initial exposure) is compact.
Then we refer to the optimal risk sharing functional approaches identi-
fied with the multi-objective maximization problem associated to m assigned
real-valued functions U1, ..., Um ( Definition 4.3.16):
(1) sup (U1(Y1), U2(Y2), ..., Um(Ym))
sub
(Y1, .., Ym) ∈ S.
and the sup-convolution problem (Definition 5.1.1)
(2) U1U2...Um(Y1, ..., Ym) = sup
m∑
i=1
Ui(Yi).
with the aim of incorporating the representation of not-necessarily total preorders
-i, essentially defined by order-preserving functions (Definition 2.2.6) and multi-
utility representations (Definition 2.2.8).
In Proposition 4.3.18 and Proposition 5.2.1 we prove that if -i is repre-
sented by an order preserving function Ui for every i, then a solution to the
multi-objective maximization problem (or equivalently to the sup-convolution
problem in 5.2.1) is optimal. Proposition 5.2.3 extends the previous considerations
for the case of preorders represented by a finite multi-utility representation. In
this context, the concepts of upper semicontinuous real-valued functions ( Defini-
tion 2.3.5) and upper semicontinuous multi-utility representations ( Definition
2.3.31) are introduced in order to determine optimal solutions. In particular,
Theorem 2.3.32, proved by considering lexicographic arguments, guarantees the
existence of a maximal element relative to a preorder - which admits a finite
upper semicontinuous multi-utility representation.
A relevant example of a (upper-semi)continuous functional is provided by
the Choquet integral, when we consider the topology L∞ of (essentially) bounded
functions on a common probability space. The case of a finite multi-utility
representation based on the Choquet integrals is of interest since each agent may
be equipped with multiple individual reward (risk) functionals where some of
them may reflect her own preferences and other are regulatory requirements.
In the case of individual translation invariant total preorders, Proposition
4.3.4 and Proposition 4.3.6 guarantee that determining Pareto optimal allocations
is in fact equivalent to determining optimal solutions for every choice of the
initial exposure. If in addition we consider the case of individual translation
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invariant preorders with comonotone super-additive utility functions, then Pareto
optima and solutions to the sup-convolution problem coincide (Proposition 5.2.8).
Since we often deal with metric spaces, the case of a compact metric feasible
set of allocations allows us to apply Rader’s theorem (Theorem 2.3.18) in order
to guarantee the existence of an upper semicontinuous utility representation for
every upper semicontinuous total preorder.
In the case of individual preorders -i (strictly) monotone with respect to
second order stochastic dominance (Definition 6.1.2), it is of help a well known
improvement theorem ( Proposition 6.1.1) that is at the base of applications of
comonotonicity in risk sharing. We apply the aforementioned theorem in order
to prove Proposition 6.2.1 that traduces the problem of finding optimal solutions
to that of studying the existence of maximal elements for a not necessarily total
coalition preorder with the individual preorders -i monotone with respect to
second order stochastic dominance. Then, we incorporate functional representa-
tions of not necessarily total preorders to the functional approaches (1) and (2)
restricted to the set of comonotone allocations.
In addition to our framework that is essentially related to problems con-
cerning risk sharing in the presence of a single risk X, we consider also the
case of risk sharing in the presence of different risky outcomes. In particular we
define a coalition preorder over different risky outcomes (Definition 5.3.2) that
incorporates also the social preorder (4.3), in this way traducing the problem of
making a choice among different initial risks to that of comparing all the possible
feasible allocations of the (different) initial risks. Under particular assumptions
provided in Proposition 5.3.5, the coalition preorder is total and the related utility
function is the associated sup-convolution.
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